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"[A] measure of such things [w]hich in any degree falls short of
the whole truth is not fair measure."I
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1 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. VI, 504c (Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d rev. ed. 1892).
Professor Lawrence Gene Sager's article, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, from which this article draws its premise and title,
opens with a slightly longer excerpt from THE REPUBLIC, containing this quote, which
Sager notes was cited in similar prefatory fashion in Maurice Finkelstein, Further Notes on
Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221, 221 (1925). See Lawrence Gene Sager,
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1212 & n.1 (1978).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional text and government action are at times
discordant in important ways. This discrepancy occurs in both
mature and emerging democracies. It can result in the
underenforcement of constitutional norms and implicate the rule
of law. When the constitutional norm involves the right to vote,
the gap between constitutions and governance inevitably triggers
concerns about democracy as well.
There is rich and ample debate within American legal
scholarship over the effect of the underenforcement of
constitutional norms on the scope and meaning of the norm. The
arguments generally fall into one of two camps. One strand of
argument suggests that judicial underenforcement of a
constitutional norm does not define the norm itself; nor does it
absolve non-judicial actors from enforcing the full conceptual
scope of the norm. That is, a constitution's "operative provisions"
are the foreground where the norm is defined.2 The basis of these
2 The respective concepts of "operative provisions" and "decision rules" exemplify
the distinction between the weight accorded to the meaning of constitutional provisions in
the first instance and that accorded to the judicial doctrine used to enforce that meaning in
the second. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1,
9 (2004) [hereinafter Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules] (defining "constitutional
operative propositions" as "constitutional doctrines that represent the judiciary's
understanding of the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort
of provision" and "constitutional decision rules" as "doctrines that direct courts how to
decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is satisfied"). See also Kermit
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arguments was originally formulated by James Bradley Thayer,'
and popularized by Lawrence Sager4 and others,s and has since
spawned its own body of legal scholarship. The second branch of
underenforcement scholarship suggests that judicial
implementation defines constitutional norms by employing the
"implementing doctrine"7 or "decision rules"' used to enforce
some aspect of the norm. A related concept advanced by Richard
Fallon and others suggests that, although underenforced norms
Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 193, 194 (2006)
("Decision rules... are rules that courts apply to determine whether rights have been
violated. They are not statements about the actual contours of rights; that is the whole
point of the distinction."); Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output
Thesis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220 (2006) [hereinafter Berman, Aspirational Rights]
(further describing the "meaning/doctrine" debate as one between "taxonomists" and
"pragmatists," respectively).
3 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
4 See Sager, supra note 1.
5 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 56,57 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword] (arguing that "the Court often
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect the
Constitution's meaning precisely"); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 38 (2001) (arguing that the Court's function of "identifying constitutional
norms and specifying their means" is conceptually distinct from its function of crafting
doctrine).
6 Indeed, there is a plethora of scholarship derived from Sager's conception of
constitutional norms and enforcement. See, e.g., Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules,
supra note 2; Berman, Aspirational Rights, supra note 2, at 220 (noting that Professor
Richard Fallon "set forth the most complete and forceful call to deprivilege meaning
relative to doctrine"); Fallon, Foreword, supra note 5, at 57.
7 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist's View of Constitutional Implementation
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 173 (2006) (defining
"implementing doctrine" as rules that courts use "in their enforcement of the relevant
[constitutional] value or principle in a cost-effective, institutionally sensitive manner").
8 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 890 (1999) (arguing that decision rules shape the contours of
constitutional propositions or rights); Hills, supra note 7, at 179 (asserting that
constitutional values "do not determine the shape of doctrine but rather are shaped by the
doctrine"). Notably, the foundational propositions of these two strands of scholarship
begin with this dichotomy, but most certainly do not end there. Indeed, the debate
extends from the role of judicial constructs in determining the scope of norms on the one
hand to the more pragmatic but no less rigorous inquiry into "decision rules" and
"judicially manageable standards." See, e.g., Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra
note 2 (distinguishing between "constitutional meanings" and "constitutional rules");
Kermit Roosevelt Ill, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court
Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655-58 (2005) (describing the "decision rules" model of
constitutional law).
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may retain broader aspirational meaning, they do not mandate
enforcement to the limit of their ideals.9
This Article aligns itself with the first branch of scholarship
and borrows the "operative provisions" thesis to examine the right
to vote when it exists as a constitutional norm in a maturing
democracy."o In particular, I extract two principles from the
"operative provisions" thesis and employ them in the contexts of
voting rights and comparative law to illustrate how and why
underenforcement of a normative right to vote can occur in newer
democracies. First, I adopt the position that the scope and
meaning of a constitutional norm may be greater than its actual
enforcement. Second, I rely on the argument that under- or non-
enforcement results not only from a lack of judicial enforcement
but also from underenforcement by the legislative and
administrative actors that are obligated to enforce constitutional
norms to their fullest extent. By employing these two principles,
this Article analyzes an under-recognized underenforcement of the
right to vote that has evaded the force of some of the most liberal
contemporary constitutions. It also analyses the subsequent
judicial enforcement of that norm as an integral step toward full
enforcement of the fair measure of the right to vote.
To illustrate this phenomenon and apply the theory of
constitutional underenforcement to practice, I use Ghana, in West
Africa-a recently designated "maturing democracy""-as a case
9 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1324-25 (2006) [hereinafter Fallon, Judicially
Manageable Standards (arguing that certain rights are "partly aspirational, embodying
ideals that do not command complete and immediate enforcement" and thereby allowing
for a "permissible disparity" between meaning and enforcement)]. But see Berman,
Aspirational Rights, supra note 2, at 227 (rejecting Fallon's aspirational norm thesis and
arguing that policymakers do not have the right to underenforce constitutional norms).
10 My adoption of the "operative provisions" analysis is based on the positive nature of
the constitutional right under consideration here and the lack of judicial interpretation of
the particular matter of prisoner voting rights in Ghana, which is the subject of this
Article, until recently. Unlike less choate constitutional values, the right to vote as
articulated in Ghana's 1992 Constitution is clear and unequivocal. See infra Part II.A.
While significant case law supports an expansive reading of the right to vote, there were
no decisional rules or implementary doctrine concerning this discrete application of the
right until March of this year. See cases cited infra notes 17, 73. Moreover, as a normative
matter, allowing for expansive conceptions of constitutional meaning seems more
consistent with the advancement of developing democracies, particularly those with
illiberal pasts, than do the more constricted conceptions that emerge from a decision rules
framework.
11 Francis Kokutse, Opposition Leader to Be Ghana's President: Atta Mills Wins in W.
African Nation's Peaceful Balloting, WASH. PosT, January 4, 2009, at A16, available at
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study. In particular, I examine Ghana's former practice of denying
voting rights to its incarcerated citizens, despite a constitutional
grant of universal adult suffrage, and the recent judicial
enforcement of the fair measure of the right to vote. The former
practice amounted to what I term a "systemic electoral
inconsistency." Systemic electoral inconsistencies are instances in
which a nation's election laws, systems, policies, or practices are at
odds with its stated ideals for democracy. Put another way, it is
when the rhetoric of a nation's democracy does not comport with
its reality.'2 When a systemic electoral inconsistency manifests as a
derogation of the constitution, it becomes a matter of
constitutional underenforcement. I argue that fair measure of the
right to vote is determined by the democratic ideals that define the
systemic electoral inconsistency when that right is an
underenforced constitutional norm. Despite underenforcement of
the right to vote, the underlying constitutional norm remains as
broad as its governing democratic ideals. Full enforcement of the
norm, thus, can be actively pursued and ultimately achieved as it
been now in Ghana.
During the course of Ghana's fifty-year history of
independence and democratization, it has served as one of Africa's
few reliable guideposts for the advancement of democracy. 3 It
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/03 (discussing Ghana's
two successful transfers of governmental power and declaring that the transfers of power
between opposing parties is a significant indicator of a nation's democratic maturity).
12 In a previous article I discussed one such systemic electoral inconsistency in which
the rhetorical goals of the Voting Rights Act and majority-minority districts, at times, do
not comport with electoral outcomes. See generally Janai S, Nelson, White Challengers,
Black Minorities: Reconciling Competition in Majority-Minority Districts with the Promise
of the Voting Rights Act, 95 GEO. L.J. 1287 (2007) (arguing that the inherent goals of the
Voting Rights Act are compromised when competition in majority-minority districts
results in the election of an individual other than the candidate of choice of the majority-
minority community).
13 See Ren6 Lemarchand, Ghana's Electoral Commission Provides Regional Model,
AFR. VOICES (U.S.), Winter/Spring 1998, at 1 ("Set against the backdrop of blocked,
aborted, flawed, and contested elections in west and central Africa from 1992 to the
present, Ghana's is a remarkable success story."). See also Kwame Boafo-Arthur,
Democracy and Stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian Experience, in 4 CLAUDE AKE
MEMORIAL PAPER SERIES 1, 7 (2008) (examining Ghana's regional success as a
democracy and attributing it largely to its ability to manage election contestation among
stakeholders without compromising democratic stability). Other examples of successful
democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa include Benin, Botswana, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, and
South Africa. See GRETCHEN BAUER AND SCOTT D. TAYLOR, POLITICS IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA: STATE AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 6 (2005) (stating that Botswana, Namibia,
and South Africa have received widespread acclaim for their successful transitions to
democracy). See generally J. Tyler Dickovick, Legacies of Leftism: Ideology, Ethnicity,
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was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence
from colonial rule and has since earned the designation of a
"maturing democracy" as a result of the successful transfer of
power between the country's leading political parties in its two
previous presidential elections.14 Most recently, Ghana's Supreme
Court reinforced its commitment to constitutionalism and full
democratic participation by enforcing the fair measure of the right
to vote.
Its notable progress notwithstanding, since its inception as a
constitutional democracy in 1992 until March of this year, Ghana
harbored a longstanding systemic electoral inconsistency. The
plain terms of Ghana's constitution provide that "[elvery citizen of
Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has
the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the
purposes of public elections and referenda."'6 Ghana's highest
court had characterized the constitutional right to vote as
belonging to "every sane Ghanaian citizen of eighteen years and
above," making no exceptions for any category of citizens other
than on the basis of age and mental capacity. Yet, Ghana did not
permit its incarcerated citizens to vote until recently. 8
and Democracy in Benin, Ghana, and Mali, 29 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 1119 (U.K.)
(2008) (discussing successful democracies in Benin, Ghana, and Mali). But see Arch
Puddington, The 2008 Freedom House Survey: A Third Year of Decline, J. DEMOCRACY,
Apr. 2009, at 93, 101-02 (finding that after years of democratic progress Sub-Saharan
Africa has experienced a year of reversals with Senegal and Namibia experiencing
declines).
14 See Kokutse, supra note 11.
15 See infra Part IL.B.
16 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 42 (emphasis added). Article 55 provides additional
political rights to Ghanaian adult citizens: "Every citizen of Ghana of voting age has the
right to join a political party." Id. art. 55(2). "Subject to the provisions of this
constitution, every citizen of voting age has the right to participate in political activity
intended to influence the composition and policies of the Government." Id art. 55(10).
Although these additional political rights are not expressly explored here, it follows that
the same analysis-concerning whether Ghana's incarcerated citizens possess voting rights
under the constitution-would generally apply to the exercise of these rights as well.
17 Tehn Addy v. Att'y Gen. & Electoral Comm'r, (19971 1 G.L.R. 47, 52-53 (Sup. Ct.,
Accra) (Ghana) [hereinafter Tehn AddyJ.
18 Since its adoption in 1992, the Provisional National Defense Council Law [PNDCLJ
284 has barred incarcerated persons from voting by virtue of its residency requirement.
Section 7(1) of the PNDCL requires that a voter be a resident of the polling division
where they seek to register. Provisional National Defense Council Law (PNDCL) 284 §
7(1) (Ghana). This residency requirement effectively prevents incarcerated citizens from
voting because section 7(5) declares that a person "who is detained in legal custody of any
place shall not be treated as a resident there." Id. Complying with Sections 7(1) and 7(5)
of the PNDCL, the EC refused to register prisoners for the 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004
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This systemic electoral inconsistency derived from both
judicial and non-judicial underenforcement of the right to vote.
Ghana's Electoral Commission (EC) refused to register Ghana's
incarcerated citizens (GICs) to vote, notwithstanding the
expansive universal adult suffrage provided in the text of Ghana's
constitution, which does not limit voting rights based on criminal
status. By all accounts, the EC's refusal to enforce the constitution
in this regard was an unofficial administrative decision that had
gone unchecked by the judiciary and the legislature, resulting in
underenforcement by all branches of government. The
constitution authorizes the EC and the president appoints its
commissioners." The EC's justification for not registering GICs
rested on two primary factors: (1) GICs could not meet the
registration qualifications of subsidiary laws that required
prospective voters to register at their current place of residence
but prohibited registrants from using prisons as an address for this
purpose;20 and (2) the judiciary had not instructed the EC to
register GICs to vote.21 As demonstrated in this Article, neither of
these explanations justified the underenforcement of the
constitution's affirmative grant of universal adult suffrage. Thus,
Ghana's unauthorized practice of criminal disfranchisement for
nearly two decades and subsequent judicial enforcement of the
right to vote provides an opportunity to analyze the broad
implications of the underenforcement of the right to vote as a
systemic electoral inconsistency and its direct bearing upon
constitutionalism and the rule of law in a maturing democracy.
Ghana now stands poised to serve as a model for both emerging
and other maturing democracies throughout sub-Saharan Africa
and beyond Africa's borders. Indeed, Ghana's constitutional
development is still sufficiently nascent to illustrate the universal
elections. See Centre for Human Rights & Civil Liberties (CHURCIL) v. The Attorney
General and Electoral Commission, [20101 _ G.L.R. - (Sup. Ct., Accra) (Ghana)
(unpublished opinion on file with author) (hereinafter Ocansey/CHURCIL) (opinion of
Owusu, JSC) (declaring "prisoners were excluded from exercising their franchise in the
1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and indeed they were so excluded in the 2008 elections"). The
Ocansey/CHURCIL decision was issued in five separate opinions, individually authored
by each of the five justices in the Superior Court of Judicature in the Supreme Court of
Ghana, otherwise referred to as the Supreme Court of Ghana, which is its highest court of
appeal. See GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 129.
19 GHANA CONST 1992 art. 43.
20 See infra Part II.C.1.
21 See supra note 18.
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challenges of newer democracies in their constitutional
enforcement efforts and overall democratization. 22
In Part II, I explore the broader context of underenforcement
of the right to vote. Building on the premise that
underenforcement can result from a lack of judicial, legislative, or
administrative enforcement, I argue that non-judicial actors are
obligated to fully enforce constitutional norms.23 I begin by briefly
defining the concept of a constitutional norm and then measuring
the scope of Ghana's constitutional norm of universal suffrage
through a disquisition of relevant legal doctrine, including the
constitutional provisions, case law, and statutes to which the EC is
bound. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,24 both a literal and
22 Far too infrequently Africa is mined for its didactic potential in the area of political
development and nation-building, where it can serve as both an exemplar of negative and
positive outcomes and a means to better understand this area of the world. See H. Kwasi
Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1249 (2006) [hereinafter Prempeh, Marbury
in Africa] (describing how scholars have largely disregarded Africa's constitutions as
comparative law sources). Indeed, because "[clontemporary Africa's democracy and
constitutionalism projects are still works-in-progress, and relatively young ones at that,"
they are rich terrain for research and study. H. Kwasi Prempeh, Africa's
"Constitutionalism Revival": False Start or New Dawn?, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 469, 506
(2007) [hereinafter Prempeh, Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival"]. Moreover, because
the bedrock of successful democratization is respect for the rule of law, examining how
developing democracies like Ghana resolve minor threats to-or deficiencies in-
adherence to the rule of law in forming their democratic identity, or in pursuing
constitutionalism, is instructive to other countries on a similar quest. This didactic
exercise is, of course, a two-way street.
Africa's newly democratizing states, like transitional democracies generally,
start off with an impoverished stock of homegrown constitutional case
law.... This dearth of domestic constitutional case law necessitates some
reliance... on relevant constitutional precedents and doctrine developed
elsewhere. While wholesale borrowing from any one foreign source is plainly
unwise and must be avoided, there is much that Africa's transitional
democracies can gain by looking to the experiences of other jurisdictions.
H. Kwasi Prempeh, A New Jurisprudence for Africa, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 135,
146.
23 This argument does not originate with this Article, although it is a developing area
of scholarship within the broader area of metadoctrinalism. Indeed, there are several
articles discussing the extent to which, if any, non-judicial actors have enforcement
obligations with respect to constitutional norms. See, e.g., Robin West, Unenumerated
Duties, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 221, 223 (2006) (highlighting a void in liberal constitutional
theory concerning the moral duties of legislative actors to enforce constitutional norms).
See also Sager, supra note 1, at 1220-28 (providing one of the earliest articulations of this
idea).
24 The U.S. Constitution does not contain a positive right to vote in its text and, thus, is
arguably subject to a different measure for enforcement purposes. This point was most
recently reinforced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
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contextual interpretation of Ghana's constitution reveal a positive
right to vote for the enjoyment of all qualified citizens, regardless
of criminal status. I further argue that one of the threats posed by
the underenforcement of constitutional norms by administrative
actors is the deference accorded to the administrative
interpretations of the norm that may later limit judicial review.
The recent litigation in Ghana's Supreme Court on the
constitutional interpretation of the right to vote, and whether it
extends to the country's more than 13,000 prisoners, bore directly
on how Ghana's judiciary resolves systemic electoral
inconsistencies produced by administrative underenforcement of
constitutional norms. Fortunately, in this instance, the
administrative interpretation of the norm did not prevent Ghana's
Supreme Court from according the right to vote its fair measure.
In order to understand why a systemic electoral inconsistency
such as underenforcement of the right to vote could exist for so
long in a maturing democracy like Ghana, I explore the political
98 (2000), where the Court recommitted itself to the principle that "[tJhe individual citizen
has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United
States...." Id. at 104. Curiously, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), which is
widely cited as establishing voting as a fundamental right, was not a voting rights case.
Rather, in Yick Wa, the Court invalidated a facially neutral California law regulating
laundries because the law was applied exclusively against Chinese laundry owners. See id
The Court reasoned:
[Tihe very idea that one man may be compelled to hold ... any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
slavery itself.
There are many illustrations that might be given of this truth,. . . [and] the
political franchise of voting is one.
Id. at 370. The Court further stated that voting is a fundamental right because it is
"preservative of all rights." Id. Nearly a century later, in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1974), a voting rights case, the Court underscored this point. Id, at 17-18 (holding that
"fojur Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
abridges" the right to vote).
However, unlike in Ghana, U.S. Courts have enforced the equal protection norm that
undergirds the right to vote for all citizens in the absence of a positive right to vote. For
example, through enforcement of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-
Fourth Amendments, the Court has upheld an equal right to vote for various categories of
citizens. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll
taxes unconstitutional in both state and federal elections); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (establishing the principle of populations equality or "one person-one vote" under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (holding that the
Fifteenth Amendment "'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination" based on race in voting); Lesser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (holding
that the Nineteenth Amendment had been properly adopted).
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context of the underenforcement. Starting with an overview of
Ghana's development as a constitutional democracy, Part III
explains how Ghana came to be the recognized constitutional
democracy that it is today. Many emerging democracies with a
similar history of military dictatorship and political unrest share
Ghana's trajectory in pursuit of constitutionalism. I argue that, in
emerging democracies with such histories, the underenforcement
of constitutional norms results from the entrenchment of illiberal
extra-constitutional norms among judicial and non-judicial actors
despite the existence of a liberal constitution.25
Part IV acknowledges that while constitutional norms should
be enforced fully by all government officials, reality proves that
the constitutional provisions articulating such norms are not
sufficient if there is no judicial enforcement. As Ghana's case
demonstrates, multilateral enforcement is necessary to ensure
protection of the right to vote. This analysis also considers the
importance of the rule of law for maturing democracies and briefly
explores the relationship between the rule of law,
constitutionalism, and democratization as enforcement
imperatives for modern constitutional democracies. At the heart
of this analysis is the determination that underenforcement of the
right to vote as a constitutional norm is detrimental to
constitutional democracy as a whole. This is especially so when
the practice contradicts popular sentiment. This appears to be
supported by at least one informal empirical study conducted in
Ghana among GICs, opinion leaders, and others, suggesting that
25 The term "illiberal" was introduced as a modifier of democracy in 1997 by author
and journalist Fareed Zakaria. See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76
FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1997). Zakaria suggests that illiberal democracies are those that run
open, free, and fair elections but do not secure basic civil rights and civil liberties for
citizens, and whose governments do not observe constitutionally determined limits on
their powers. See id. at 22-25. My use of the term illiberal to describe Ghana's
underenforcement of the right to vote does not suggest that Ghana is itself an illiberal
democracy. For reasons fully articulated in this Article, it is clear that Ghana is thriving as
a democracy in both form and substance. Indeed, by Zakaria's own definition, Ghana is a
liberal democracy; its "political system [is] marked not only by free and fair elections, but
also by the rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of
speech, assembly, religion, and property." Id. at 22. Rather, I employ delicate use of the
term "illiberal" to underscore the inconsistency-i.e., the systemic electoral
inconsistency-between Ghana's broad constitutional grant of universal suffrage and the
underenforcement of that right by its government, which results in part from Ghana's
illiberal history. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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Ghanaians as a whole did not support the disfranchisement of
GICs?6
Finally, the Article concludes by considering why systemic
electoral inconsistencies occur concerning the right to vote. The
conclusion posits that in many, but not all, instances where the
right to vote is underenforced, marginalized populations with
fewer resources to command enforcement suffer the consequences
of underenforcement most directly. Ghana's prior disparate
treatment of its citizens abroad and its incarcerated citizens at
home underscores this point.
Passivity toward the enforcement of constitutional norms,
particularly systemic electoral inconsistencies involving the right to
vote, is antithetical to the democratic identity and the principles of
a constitutional democracy. In Ghana's case, like many others, the
underenforcement of the right to vote with respect to a
marginalized class of citizens, such as persons incarcerated for
criminal behavior, may not by itself threaten to dismantle an entire
democratic regime. However, it is one of the many wounds that
systemic electoral inconsistencies and the underenforcement of
constitutional norms inflict on the integrity of constitutional
democracies, especially newer ones, which can cumulatively
weaken the democratic enterprise. Judicial enforcement of
constitutional norms is therefore a crucial backstop to preserve
democratization and constitutionalism in maturing democracies.
II. MEASURING THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN A MATURING
DEMOCRACY: GHANA As CASE STUDY
The right to vote, while popularly recognized as fundamental
to democracy, is also widely understood to be subject to
reasonable limitations. The legal instrument that grants the right
to vote often aids the determination of the scope and breadth of
the right, as well as the reasonableness of the limitations placed
upon it. When a written constitution establishes the right to vote,
the constitution becomes the baseline for constructing the scope of
the right and gives rise to the enforcement of the right.27
26 In 2005 and 2006, I lived and conducted research in Ghana on democratization,
prison conditions, and the practice of criminal disfranchisement as a Fulbright Scholar.
The methodology for and outcomes of my informal empirical research are set forth in Part
IV.B. See also infra note 202.
27 However, as noted above, the right to vote is not always constitutionally enshrined.
See supra note 24.
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However, constitutional text establishing the right to vote and
government action enforcing that same right are not always
harmonious and, in fact, can be discordant in important ways. At
least one of the important ways in which this discord manifests is
in the underenforcement of constitutional norms. The effect of
this underenforcement, particularly if it results from judicial
passivity, is particularly acute not only from the standpoint of
those directly affected by the underenforcement but also because
of the impact that judicial underenforcement has in the legislative
and administrative arenas.
American scholars have engaged in rigorous debate regarding
constitutional interpretation and the scope of underenforced
constitutional norms since the 1970s. Professor Mitchell Berman
coined the term "metadoctrinalism," to refer to the body of
scholarship that "concerns itself with the fact of doctrine but not
with its particular content."28 Examples include the study of the
U.S. Supreme Court's role in interpreting and implementing the
Constitution without regard to the substantive content of the
provisions at issue. This Article contributes to the metadoctrinal
discussion-at a point before the debates surrounding "decision
rules," 9 "implementing doctrine," "operative propositions,"30
"aspirational rights,"31 and the like begin-by extracting the
underlying query regarding the effect of the underenforcement of
constitutional norms and employing it in the contexts of voting
rights and comparative law.
Indeed, the foundational principles within the body of
metadoctrinal scholarship are universal. A threshold query is
whether a constitutional norm can exist in a form that is broader
than its enforcement. As noted above, this question is usually
answered in one of two ways. Some constitutional theorists argue
that judicial underenforcement co-terminously circumscribes the
scope of the right.32 Others argue that the right maintains its
original scope and breadth despite the judicial
28 Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 2, at 4 (emphasis in original)
(defining the term and citing Larry Sager's Fair Measure, among examples of
metadoctrinal scholarship, as one of the earliest works of metadoctrinalism).
29 Id. at 16.
30 Id.
31 See Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 9, at 1324-25 (arguing that
certain rights in the constitution are "partly aspirational, embodying ideals that do not
command complete and immediate enforcement").
32 See, e.g., supra note 2.
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underenforcement. One of the reasons that the effect of judicial
underenforcement matters is because of what Sager and others
have described as the independent onus of legislative and
administrative constitutional norm enforcement, If other
government actors have a burden to enforce the constitution that
is equal to or greater than that of the judiciary, whether judicial
underenforcement of a constitutional norm involving the right to
vote defines the scope of the right becomes even more
consequential.
I examine below what constitutes a constitutional norm and
use Ghana's constitution to demonstrate how a norm is
constructed in the form of a right to vote. I then explore the prior
underenforcement of Ghana's right to vote, and the recent judicial
enforcement of the norm, within the current metadoctrinal debate
on the impact of underenforcement. I conclude that
underenforcement of the right to vote by any government actor is
careless at best and detrimental to democracy and the rule of law
at worst, but that judicial enforcement of the fair measure of the
norm potentially remediates the underenforcement in all spheres.
A. The Right to Vote as a Constitutional Norm
A constitutional norm is a concept expressed in the text of a
constitution that embodies a normative value. Some
constitutional texts, including that of the United States, articulate
precepts that give rise to specific rights and privileges because of
the rules used to enforce them, otherwise known as the "decision
rules."35 Accordingly, a specific concept, such as the right to vote,
can achieve normative status in a constitution if it is expressed as a
positive right,3 6 and if other constitutional provisions also reinforce
the concept. A supermajority of national constitutions in the
world contains a positive right to vote. The right to vote as set
33 Id.
34 See Sager, supra note 1, at 1213 (describing a constitutional norm as "a statement
which describes an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution").
35 See Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, supra note 2, at 9.
36 See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 175 (2d ed. 1990) (1975)
(defining normative statements as those that are not precatory or stated in the conditional,
but rather, are assumptive of the validity of what ought to be done).
37 This assertion is based on my informal survey of world constitutions, which reveals
that a supermajority of the constitutions of democratic nations contains an express right to
vote in their texts. See generally Constitutions of All Countries,
http://www.cmseducation.org/wconsts/ (reprinting and excerpting text from constitutions
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forth in Ghana's 1992 Constitution is among the most expansive
and robust.
Ghana's 1992 Constitution, which became effective in 1993,
sets forth the blueprint for the latest and most lasting incarnation
of democracy since Ghana achieved independence in 1957.
Essential to Ghana's democratic framework is the position that the
Constitution occupies as the nation's supreme body of law. 3 9 The
Constitution's seventh chapter, which is entitled "Representation
of the People," sets forth the constitutional mandates concerning
the right to vote; the establishment, composition, and duties of the
Electoral Commission of Ghana; and the structure and operation
of political parties.'
Article 42 of the Constitution contains the textual basis for
the right. The plain text of Article 42 establishes that "[elvery
citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound
mind has the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter
for the purposes of public elections and referenda."4 The
Constitution confers these rights, referred to collectively herein as
"the right to vote," without any qualification, restriction, or
around the world). Among these, the right to vote is not without limitation. Indeed, many
constitutions have express limitations based on age, citizenship, and, to a lesser extent,
criminal status or other legal standing. See infra note 121.
38 H. Kwasi Prempeh, Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling
Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
761,766(2008)
39 See Afrobarometer, Briefing Paper No. 20, Parliament of the Fourth Republic of
Ghana-Views from the Grassroots 1 (2005), available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/
papers/AfrobriefNo20.pdf [hereinafter AFROBAROMETER No. 20]. Ghana's 1992
Constitution consists of twenty-six chapters, containing a total of 299 articles, excluding
schedules. In 1990, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) created the
National Commission for Democracy (NCD), and charged it with organizing a series of
regional debates considering Ghana's political and economic future. T.C. McCaskie,
Recent History, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 2003, at 446,447 (Katharine Murison
ed., 32d ed. 2003). In March 1991, the NCD presented its results and recommendations
for a constitutional framework to the PNDC, Id. at 448. Around this time, a Committee
of Experts was created to draft proposals that would be incorporated into a new
constitution, taking into account previous constitutions of Ghana, the work of the NCD,
and other national constitutions. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, A Decade of Liberalism in
Perspective, in GHANA: ONE DECADE OF THE LIBERAL STATE 1, 2-3 (Kwame Boafo-
Arthur ed., 2007). In March 1992, the Consultative Assembly endorsed most
constitutional recommendations from the Committee of Experts. McCaskie, supra, at 448.
In a national referendum on April 28, 1992, with 43.7% of the electorate voting, 92% of
voters approved the draft constitution. Id.
40 See generally GHANA CONST. 1992 ch. 7.
41 Id. art. 42 (emphasis added).
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condition, other than the three prerequisites of (1) citizenship,'
(2) age (18 and above), and (3) sanity.4 3 Importantly, unlike
certain other provisions of the Constitution, Article 42 is self-
executing.44  Article 42 cannot be subject to any other
constitutional provision or to the discretionary authority of any
government official or institution; nor does its enforceability
require legislative action by Parliament. Accordingly, as a matter
of strict interpretation, Article 42 establishes the right to vote as
irreducible and inviolable.'
Article 42 is devoid of the express restrictions based on
criminal status contained in pre-independence versions of the
Constitution.46  Article 1 of the 1960 Constitution of Ghana
provided:
[W]ithout distinction of sex, race, religion or political belief,
every person who, being by law a citizen of Ghana, has attained
42 The 1992 Constitution sets forth the laws establishing citizenship in Ghana. See id.
art 6(1). Section 18 of the Citizenship Act of 2000 establishes the criteria for deprivation
of citizenship. Citizenship Act, 2000 (Act 591) [Ghana], 5 January 2001, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3edal35a2.html (last visited March 28, 2010).
Notably, neither the 1992 Constitution nor the Citizenship Act of 2000 conditions
citizenship, or the deprivation thereof, upon criminal status.
43 The EC's website generally mirrors these registration qualifications:
Who can register:
Every citizen of Ghana of sound mind has the right to vote and entitled
to be registered as a voter for the purpose of public elections and
referenda[.]
Qualification for registration:
* Applicant must be a Ghanaian
* Must be 18 years of age or above
* Must be of a sound mind
* Should be residents or ordinarily residents in the electoral areawhere
he /she wants to register
* Must not be prohibited by any law in force from registering as avoter
Electoral Commission of Ghana, Who Can Register, http://www.ec.gov.ghl?q=node/51
(last visited Aug. 14,2009) (formatting and punctuation of original source altered).
44 For example, Article 22, which regulates the property rights of spouses, and Article
28, which defines the rights of children, requires parliamentary action to enact appropriate
legislation to give effect to these constitutional provisions. See GHANA CONST. 1992 arts.
22,28.
45 Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 21 (holding that "the
express provisions of article 42 of the 1992 Constitution confer[] the right to vote on all
Ghanaians, save those below eighteen years and persons on unsound mind").
46 See F.A.R. BENNION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 119 (1962)
(discussing the repeal of Ghana's previous constitutions).
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the age of twenty-one years and is not disqualified by law on
grounds of absence, infirmity of mind or criminality, shall be
entitled to one vote, to be cast in freedom and secrecy.4 7
However, in every subsequent constitution, Ghana has
omitted any reference to criminality in favor of an increasingly
broad right to universal adult suffrage.48  The contextual
interpretation of the Constitution signals a post-independence
intent to grant a more expansive franchise than in previous
constitutions and to eliminate restrictions on voting for all citizens,
including GICs.
B. Evolving Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Vote
As noted above, the metadoctrinal debate regarding the scope
of underenforced constitutional norms is expansive. An important
outgrowth of this scholarship is a closer examination of non-
judicial government actors in the context of constitutional
enforcement.4 9 Judicial underenforcement occurs when the rules
or constructs that courts use to enforce a constitutional norm
result in extending a right that is narrower than the norm.
Legislative underenforcement similarly occurs when legislators fail
to enact laws that implement the constitutional norm at issue for
reasons ranging from practical costs to apathy. Likewise,
administrative underenforcement occurs when administrators fail
to create rules or take sufficient enforcement action to animate a
constitutional norm. With respect to each of these categories of
47 GHANA CONST. 1960 art. 1 (emphasis added).
48 GHANA CONST. 1969 art. 29 ("Every citizen of Ghana being twenty-one years of age
and of sound mind shall have the right to vote; and accordingly shall be entitled to be
registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections."); GHANA CONST. 1979 art. 36
("A citizen of Ghana not being less than eighteen years of age and of sound mind shall
have the right to vote; and accordingly he shall be entitled to be registered as a voter for
purposes of public elections and referenda"). Despite the existence of these clear
constitutional provisions since 1969, GICs have never been afforded the right to vote.
49 See, e.g., West, supra note 23, at 221.
50 Judicial non-enforcement occurs when judicial actors fail to enforce a constitutional
provision, including for reasons of non-justiciability. See, e.g, Sager, Fair Measure, supra
note 1, at 1224-27 (attributing certain judicial enforcement to nonjusticiability under the
political question doctrine); Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards, supra note 9, at 1306
(observing that "a determination of nonjusticiability due to the absence of judicially
manageable standards is simply the limiting case of a decision to underenforce
constitutional norms").
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governmental underenforcement, there may also be non-
enforcement resulting from inaction."
This Article takes the position that a constitution's operative
provisions define the scope of the right, and that both judicial and
non-judicial actors are duty bound to enforce the right to its fullest
extent." Ghana's prior underenforcement of the 1992
Constitution concerning GICs' right to vote illustrates this point.
Even though Ghana had not enforced its right to vote provisions
fully, those norms were no less expansive in their definition than
when first enacted, permitting Ghana's Supreme Court later to
enforce the fair measure of the constitutional norm. Integral to
the analysis of whether Ghana's prior disfranchisement of GICs
will have measurable repercussions in shaping its profile as a
democracy is the extent to which the recent judicial enforcement
of the right to vote reverses the administrative departure from the
Constitution and the scope and timeliness of the implementation
of the court's decision. This investigation involves a literal
interpretation of the text of Ghana's Constitution, as well as an
understanding of how the foremost arbiters of its meaning-the
judiciary, legislature, and administrative agencies of Ghana-have
interpreted it. Ghana's practice of disfranchisement violated the
rule of law and constitutionalism because it was inconsistent with
the broad grant of universal adult suffrage contained in the
Constitution. Remediating this systemic electoral inconsistency
required an unambiguous constitutional interpretation and a
forceful statement of the constitutional norm by Ghana's highest
court in the first instance. Full realization of the fair measure of
51 The failure to fully implement or enforce a constitutional norm may result from both
underenforcement and non-enforcement. In the case of a constitutional norm of universal
suffrage, voting rights may be enforced with respect to most eligible voters most of the
time, but may not be enforced with respect to others, which results in under-enforcement
of the norm as a whole and non-enforcement with respect to the individuals or groups
denied voting rights.
52 The position I take in this Article falls shy of Sager's "justice seeking" approach,
outlined in his composite work, LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A
THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). Sager's "justice seeking"
thesis envisions a "transtemporal partnership at the heart of our constitutional practice"
between the framers and judges, because "the heart of the social project of constitutional
justice is the impartiality and generality of the moral perspective." Id. at 73, 76 (internal
citation omitted). While I do not disagree with this position, the specific issue and case
study that I examine here do not require that I to employ Sager's more generous outlook,
considering the strength of the constitutional provisions under consideration. The "justice
seeking" approach, however, is more closely aligned with my notion of "systemic electoral
inconsistencies." See id. at 76.
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the norm now lies in thoughtful administrative enforcement of the
norm as framed by the judiciary.
1. The Ghanaian Context
Prior to March of this year, there were no reported judicial
opinions involving the voting rights of prisoners in Ghana. On
November 12, 2009, the Court consolidated the cases of Ahumah
Ocansey v. The Electoral Commission,3 and Centre for Human
Rights and Civil Liberties (CHURCIL) v. The Attorney General
and the Electoral Commission4 [hereinafter Ocansey/CHURCIL],
both of which sought an interpretation of Article 42 of the
constitution to determine its application to convicted and remand
prisoners, respectively.
Ahumah Ocansey, a legal practitioner and advocate for
prisoner rights, brought suit in his capacity as a Ghanaian citizen."
Ocansey asserted that under Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution,
and other articles within the constitution, it is unconstitutional and
illegal to exclude prisoners from the class of persons qualified to
vote." CHURCIL brought its suit as a non-profit civil society
organizer committed to upholding the fundamental human and
constitutional rights of remand prisoners under the 1992
Constitution. Their collective prayers for relief were for
declaratory judgment that (1) Section 7(5) of the Representation
of the People Act (ROPAL) is unconstitutional because it violates
Article 42 of the Constitution by denying voting rights to remand
and convicted prisoners; (2) Parliament acted in excess of its
53 Suit#J1/4/2008 (2010) (Ghana) (unpublished opinion on file with author).
54 Suit#Jl/5/2008 (2010) (Ghana) (unpublished opinion on file with author). About the
same time that Ocansey v. The Electoral Commission was filed, the Legal Resources
Centre (LRC) in Ghana filed an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the EC to
register GICs in advance of the December 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections.
LRC filed the case on behalf of Kobla Senorpe, a prisoner of Ghana's Ho region, and on
behalf of all other prisoners otherwise eligible to register and vote in public elections and
referenda. LRC Files Writ to Register Prisoners to Vote, MODERN GHANA NEWS, July 28,
2008, http://www.modernghana.cominews/176219/1/Irc-files-writ-to-register-prisoners-to-
vote.html (last visited March 27, 2010). In its supporting affidavit, LRC asserted that it
wrote to the EC in May 2008 to remind the EC of its responsibilities to register Ghanaian
prisoners who meet the age and sanity qualifications so that they could vote in public
elections and referenda and that, on June 10, the EC responded that it was unable to
register the prisoners for voting because of legal restrictions under PNDCLs. Id. The writ
failed with no reported decision, essentially leaving no judicial footprint on this issue.
55 Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 3.
56 Id. at 4.
57 Id. at 1-3,
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powers by enacting Provisional National Defense Council" Law
284 (PNDCL); and (3) Section 7(5) unduly discriminates against
remand prisoners because the amended Section 8 of PNDCL 284
enables Ghanaian residents abroad to register and vote in public
elections and referenda -despite the residency requirement-
while denying prisoners in Ghana the right to vote-as a result of
the residency requirement." In addition, the petitioners prayed to
the Supreme Court to compel the EC to exercise its constitutional
powers to facilitate and ensure registration of and voting by
GICs." Both the Attorney General and the EC opposed the relief
sought by plaintiffs on the grounds that the vote denial was not a
curtailment of the rights of GICs under the constitution, in light of
the statutory provisions prohibiting GICs from registering to vote
for want of a noncustodial legal residence.6
There are only a handful of cases that loosely create a
doctrinal framework within which to analyze the scope of Article
42 and the novel challenges to Ghana's criminal disfranchisement
practice that these consolidated cases present. In Tehn Addy v.
Electoral Commissioner, one of Ghana's few election law cases,
58 The PNDC was Ghana's governmental regime from December 31, 1981, through
January 7, 1993, and came into force as a result of a coup d'6tat orchestrated by Jerry
Rawlings. PNDCL 284 and all other legislation passed under the PNDC's governance are
considered law even though their passage preceded the establishment of the current
constitutional democratic government. PNDCLs, along with other laws passed under
previous regimes, retain full force under the 1992 Constitution unless they are expressly
repealed, abrogated, or in conflict with the Constitution. See GHANA CONST. 1992 art.
1(2) ("This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be
inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the
inconsistency, be void."). Subsequent laws passed by the EC share the same degree of
authority as PNDCLs and other laws subordinate to the Constitution. See generally Kim
Stanton, The Subsidiary Legislation Process in Ghana: Review and Recommendations for
Reform (Ghana Ctr. For Democratic Dev., Critical Perspective No. 14, 2003) ("Parliament
does not make all of the laws that regulate the daily conduct and activities of Ghanaians.
Rather, Parliament frequently delegates authority to an external body to create a form of
law referred to as subsidiary legislation (or delegated or subordinate legislation)"). Id. at
1. Although subsidiary legislation typically connotes laws promulgated by legally
authorized public bodies other than Parliament, the fact that PNDCL was not enacted by
the current parliament makes it more akin to subsidiary legislation in terms of its
procedural genesis. Nonetheless, PNDCL is accorded the same weight as Parliamentary
legislation unless expressly abrogated or repealed. Id. at 2 ("[Slubsidiary legislation like
primary legislation itself, has the full force of law and often creates or alters legally
enforceable rights and obligations.").
59 Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 3.
60 Id. Ocansey also separately sought declarations that PNDCL was in contravention
of other constitutional provisions. See id. at 4.
61 Id. (opinion of Wood, C.J.) at 12-13.
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Ghana's Supreme Court provided an expansive interpretation of
Article 42 and illuminated its breadth.62 The Tehn Addy decision
involved a challenge to a voter registration policy, set by the EC,
whereby voters could register only within a specified period.63
Relying on Article 42, the Court unanimously held that the EC
could not refuse to register Mr. Addy and ordered the EC to
register him.64 The Court reasoned that the right to vote is a
constitutional right, derived from Article 42, and that, because the
Constitution is the supreme law of Ghana, no qualified citizen of
Ghana can be denied the rights it confers.65 Indeed, while
acknowledging the various interpretations of the right to vote, the
Court advised that, "[w]hatever the philosophical thought on the
right to vote, article 42 of the Constitution, 1992 of Ghana makes
the right to vote, a constitutional right conferred on every
Ghanaian citizen of eighteen years and above." 66 Emphasizing the
importance of the right to vote within the larger framework of
democracy, the Court stated that through "the exercise of this
right, the citizen is able not only to influence the outcome of the
elections and therefore the choice of a government but also he is in
a position to help influence the course of social, economic and
62 Tehn Addy, supra note 17, at 47-54.
63 Id. at 50. Mr. Addy, the named plaintiff, a fifty-seven year-old pastor, was on a
clergy visit in Toronto, Canada during the one-month period in October 1995 that Ghana's
Electoral Commission established for registering eligible voters intending to vote in the
1996 general elections. Id. Upon his return to Ghana, Mr. Addy wrote a letter to the EC,
dated March 27, 1996, demanding that it permit him to register, to which he received no
response. Id. The EC later established a supplementary registration period from June 1
through June 9, 1996, for the purposes of registering Ghanaians who attained the age of
eighteen after the close of the October 1995 registration window. Id. Mr. Addy made a
second attempt to register during this period and the EC refused to register him. Id. Mr.
Addy subsequently brought a challenge in the Supreme Court against the EC and the
Attorney General seeking: (1) declaratory judgment that the EC's failure or refusal to
register him as a voter was inconsistent with and in contravention of Articles 42, 45, and 46
of the constitution; (2) declaratory judgment that the Articles 42, 45, and 46 require the
EC to exercise its discretion to register him as a voter outside the October 1995 window,
as it exercised its discretion to register newly eligible voters in early June 1996; and (3) a
permanent injunction against the EC's certification of the provisional register until it
registered Mr. Addy as a voter. Id. Although the EC conceded the substance of Mr.
Addy's claim, it argued that the suspension of the registration exercise was the result of a
pending suit against the EC, brought by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and People's
Convention Party (PCP), and filed in the high court for declaratory judgment that the
supplemental registration exercise was illegal. Id. at 50-51.
64 Id. at 53-54.
65 Id. at 53.
66 Id. at 52-53.
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political affairs thereafter.""7 For these reasons, the Court found
that "the exercise of this right of voting, is ... indispensable in the
enhancement of the democratic process, and cannot be denied in
the absence of a constitutional provision to that effect.""
In summarizing that the letter and spirit of Article 42
establishes that "every sane Ghanaian citizen of eighteen years
and above, ha[s] the right under Article 42 of the 1992
Constitution to be registered as a voter," the Court made no
exception for GICs.69 Rather, the Court linked this important
right to the Preamble to the 1992 Constitution, which proclaims,
"The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in
whose name and for whose welfare the powers of Government are
to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in
this Constitution."70 The Court further explained that "in order to
give meaning and content to the exercise of this sovereign power
by the people of Ghana, article 42 of the Constitution, 1992
guarantees the right to vote to every sane citizen of eighteen years
and above.""
The Court recognized the EC's authority to place limits on
the right to vote. However, in order to determine the
constitutionality of the EC's conduct, the Court employed a
balancing test, weighing the timing of the elections and the
potential hardship to the EC in conducting its voter registration
program, in the face of a pending legal challenge, against
permitting the exercise of the constitutional right to vote. The
Court's analytical approach suggests that a balancing test might be
an appropriate means of determining the extent to which the EC
67 Id. at 50. The Court also relied heavily on international law as persuasive authority,
citing in particular the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case Wesberry, in which the Court
held that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the
election of those who make the laws . . .." Id. at 52 (citing Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17). In
addition, the Court relied on scholarship and legal opinions from England and Canada in
order to support its decision. Id. at 52.
68 Tehn Addy, supra note 17, at 50 (emphasis added). Ghana's constitution can only be
amended by national referendum in which at least forty percent of eligible voters
participate and seventy-five percent of those voters cast ballots in favor of amending the
Constitution as proposed. GHANA CONsT. 1992 art. 290(4).
69 Id. at 53.
7o Id.
71 Id. at 53-54. To further substantiate the importance of the right to vote, the Court
cited the significant civil disabilities that attach to non-registration. See id. (citing GHANA
CONST. 1992 art. 62(c)).
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has authority to place limitations on the right to vote.n However,
the absence of a test is not what gives rise to the systemic electoral
inconsistency resulting from the disfranchisement of GICs.
In Apaloo v. Electoral Commissioner, Ghana's highest court
reiterated its commitment to universal suffrage and identified the
right to vote as a right of international scope and import, stating,
"In the contemporary world, any limitation on suffrage is rejected.
It is universally accepted that there is no reason at all for exclusion
of the right to vote or any limitation to it considering that all men
are created equal and have a vote each."73  With respect to the
EC's obligations, the Court further declared, "[I]t is incumbent on
the Electoral Commission to provide by all legitimate means for
the free and unlimited exercise of the citizens' franchise in
conformity with both the letter and spirit of the Constitution." 74
The Court also provided guidance on the construction of election
laws generally, stating that "[t]he principle regarding the
interpretation of election laws is that they should be construed
liberally in favour of the right to vote rather than a denial of that
right."
Read together, Tehn Addy and Apaloo instruct that judicial
enforcement of Article 42 favors an expansive reading of the right
72 Id. at 54 ("Looking at the timetable for the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections, and further on the balance of hardship, the plaintiff and other qualified
unregistered citizens as opposed to the political parties in the High Court suit, stand to be
deprived of their voting rights on the election day. We therefore realized that it would be
unfair to deny the plaintiff and the unregistered citizens such a constitutional right.").
73 Apaloo v. Electoral Comm'r, [200111 G.L.R. 1 (Ghana).
74 Id. at 19.
75 Id. The Court's constitutional analysis in Apaloo involved a determination of the
substance of the right to vote granted under Article 42 and its relationship to the EC's
authority to regulate elections and promulgate rules concerning election administration.
Id. at 11-12. Specifically, the court considered whether the EC could satisfy the notice and
publication requirements of Articles 51 and 297(e) of the Constitution by publishing a
directive concerning the use of Photo Identity Card for voting in the 2000 Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections in a Gazette. Id. at 6-7. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled
that the EC's actions were unconstitutional. Id. at 1. As part of its analysis, the Court
considered to what extent the EC could limit the right to vote in the fulfillment of its
duties and obligations under the Constitution. Id. Starting from the premise that Article
42 of the Constitution requires a "benevolent approach" in construing its ambit, the Court
relied on two state court opinions from the United States to support its expansive reading
of the right to vote. See id. (citing State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla.
1940) ("Generally, the courts in construing statutes relating to elections, hold that the
same should receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen whose right to vote they
tend to restrict and in so doing to prevent disfranchisement of legal voters .... ") and State
ex rel. Whitley v. Rinehart, 192 So. 819, 823 (Fla. 1939) ("Election laws should be
construed liberally in favor of the right to vote, . . ."))-
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to vote. The Ocansey/CHURCIL decision subsequently
exemplified the appropriate judicial enforcement of the fair
measure of this constitutional norm. Against a backdrop of
longstanding underenforcement of the norm, Ghana's Supreme
Court relied on the doctrinal framework set forth above to hold
that Article 42 conferred voting rights on both convicted and
remand prisoners, notwithstanding subsidiary legislation to the
contrary.76 In reaching this conclusion, Ghana's Supreme Court
embraced a "fair measure" construct in noting that
[tihe jurisprudence of this court does show that [Constitutions
and fundamental human rights] must be broadly, liberally,
generously or expansively construed, in line with the spirit of
the constitution, history, our aspirations, core values,
principles, and with a view to promoting, enhancing human
rights rather than derogating from it [sic]. 77
The court further recognized that the lack of enforcement of
Article 42 stands in contradiction to these goals7
As a textual matter, other provisions of Ghana's constitution
reinforce a broad reading of Article 42 and support the general
notion that equality under the law, as well as respect for the rule of
law, are integral to Ghana's democratic identity. The Preamble of
Ghana's Constitution declares a clear commitment to the
"[p]rinciple of [u]niversal [a]dult [s]uffrage" and the "protection
and preservation of fundamental [h]uman [r]ights and
[f]reedoms."7 9  Similarly, Article 37(1) of the Constitution
affirmatively compels the state to maintain a public environment
of the highest order:
The State shall endeavour to secure and protect a social order
founded on the ideas and principles of freedom, equality,
justice, probity and accountability as enshrined in Chapter 5 of
this Constitution; and in particular, the State shall direct its
policy towards ensuring that every citizen has equality of rights,
obligations and opportunities before the law.80
76 See, e.g., Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 24-33.
77 Id. at 20.
78 Id. at 29 ("There can be no true democracy without protecting human rights, rule of
law, and the independence of the judiciary.") (quoting former President of the Israeli
Supreme Court Judge Aharon Barak, AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION
IN LAW (2005)).
79 GHANA CONST. 1992 pmbl.
80 Id. art. 37.
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The underenforcement of voting rights vis-A-vis GICs appears
to violate other constitutional norms as well. Chapter 5, which
defines the fundamental human rights and freedoms recognized
and enforced by the government, specifically provides that "[a]ll
persons shall be equal before the law,"" and "[a] person shall not
be discriminated against on grounds of ... social or economic
status."8 2  Furthermore "[a]ll citizens shall have the right and
freedom to form or join political parties and to participate in
political activities subject to such qualifications and law as are
necessary in a free and democratic society and are consistent with
this Constitution." Notably, the court stopped short of holding
that the denial of voting rights to GICs constituted a violation of
this provision. 4 Moreover, none of the opinions of the justices of
the court went as far as to impugn the EC for its failure to register
GICs. 5  Instead, the court rejected the EC's arguments of
administrative impossibility by stating that those arguments
"examined in the best of lights . . . would have no place in
participatory democracy, with the guaranteed rights that are
enshrined in the Constitution.""6
2. The International Context
Courts in several other countries have decided constitutional
challenges to the practice of criminal disfranchisement, offering
further guidance on constitutional enforcement of the particular
norm of the right to vote. Indeed, since 2003, the highest courts in
a1 Id, art. 17(1).
82 Id. art. 17(2).
83 Id. art. 21(3). Additional underenforcement concerns arise with respect to persons
who are in detention awaiting trial or other procedural action and have not been found
guilty, of which there are a relatively considerable number. See, e.g., id. art. 15(3) ("A
person who has not been convicted of a criminal offence shall not be treated as a convicted
person and shall be kept separately from convicted persons.").
84 See, e.g., Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Date-Bah, J.S.C.), at 8-9
(finding it "unnecessary to determine, on the facts and pleadings on this case, the scope of
the right to dignity under the 1992 Constitution"). The Chief Justice acknowledged,
however, that while the right to vote established under Article 42 is not enumerated in
Chapter 5 and, rather, falls under Chapter 6, "there is no doubt, that voting rights
constitute a fundamental right of such significance or importance it does qualify as a
fundamental human right." Id. (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 18-19.
85 See, e.g., id. (opinion of Dotse, J.S.C.), at 29 ("[I1n my humble opinion, the Electoral
Commission cannot be faulted."); (opinion of Date-Bah, J.S.C.) at 9 (expressing
reluctance to grant relief that would suggest that the EC "is defeatist of the civic
responsibility of Ghanaians").
86 Id. (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 36.
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South Africa, Canada, and Australia have issued legal opinions
interpreting the right to vote as set forth in their respective
constitutions and governing instruments and determining the
validity of criminal disfranchisement. Reflecting a broader global
trend of expanding opportunities for political participation by
underrepresented groups, each of these opinions favors the
extension of voting rights to incarcerated persons in some form.87
In Sauvg v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
determined the constitutionality of a law passed by the Canadian
Parliament denying the right to vote to "every person who is
imprisoned in a correctional institution serving a sentence of two
years or more."' Rejecting the government's arguments that
criminal disenfranchisement would enhance civic responsibility,
respect for the rule of law, and the general purpose of criminal
sanctions, the Court struck down the law. The Court rejected this
law, finding that the right to vote is fundamental to the rule of law
and criminal disenfranchisement is inconsistent with the respect
for the dignity of every person that lies at the heart of democracy.89
The Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, explained that electoral
democracy demands full enforcement of the right to vote by all
sane, voting-age citizens:
Denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote misrepresents
the nature of our rights and obligations under the law and
consequently undermines them. In a democracy such as ours,
the power of lawmakers flows from the voting citizens, and
lawmakers act as the citizens' proxies. This delegation from
voters to legislators gives the law its legitimacy or force .... In
sum, the legitimacy of the law and the obligation to obey the
law flow directly from the right of every citizen to vote ....
87 See, e.g., United Nations Public Administration Network, Chapter 6: Political
Participation, available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
APCITYIUNPAN002539.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) (discussing United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) efforts to increase opportunities for women in
political participation in Mali, Thailand, and Peru); see also James Pomfret, Hong Kong to
Thaw Political Reform Process Next Month, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2009/10/14/world/international-uk-hongkong-
democracy.html?emc=etal.
88 Sauv6 v. Canada, [20021 3 S.C.R. 519, 521, 2002 SCC 68, available at
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc68/2002scc68.pdf (citing Canada Elections
Act, R.S.C., ch. E 2 (1985), available at http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/canada/
elections.html).
89 Id. $ 1.
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The government gets this connection exactly backwards when
it attempts to argue that depriving people of a voice in
government teaches them to obey the law. The "educative
message" that the government purports to send by
disenfranchising inmates is both anti-democratic and internally
self-contradictory. Denying a citizen the right to vote denies
the basis of democratic legitimacy.9 0
In particular, the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
McLachlin, grounds its decision on the Constitution's right to vote:
The right of every citizen to vote, guaranteed by [section] 3 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, lies at the heart
of Canadian democracy.... The question is whether the
government has established that this denial of the right to vote
is allowed under [section] 1 of the Charter as a "reasonable
limi[ti . .. demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society." I conclude that it is not. The right to vote, which lies
at the heart of Canadian democracy, can only be trammeled for
good reason. Here, the reasons offered do not suffice.9'
Similarly, following a decision in an earlier case,' South
Africa's Parliament enacted a statute that prohibits voting by
incarcerated individuals.3 In Minister of Home Affairs v. National
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders
(NICRO),94 the Constitutional Court reviewed the government's
reasons for limiting the voting rights of prisoners and unanimously
held the new statute unconstitutional, reaffirming its earlier
holding that the practice of disenfranchising incarcerated persons
is unconstitutional. 5 In explaining its reasoning, the Court stated
90 Id, IT 31-32.
91 Id. 1 1 (second alteration in original).
92 August & Another v Electoral Comm'n & Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 8 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZACC/1999/3.pdf (holding that, absent
constitutional or statutory authority providing for voter disqualification on the basis of
incarceration, the EC must make the necessary arrangements to allow prisoners to register
and vote in elections).
93 Electoral Laws Amendment Act 2003, GOVERNMENT GAZETTE 25687 GN 1641, 6
November 2003, 14, available at http://www.info.gov.zalviewlDownloadFileAction?
id=68011.
94 Minister of Home Affairs v Nat'l Inst. for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration
of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at 311-13, 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) at 476-
78 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/zalcases/ZACC/2004/10.pdf.
95 Minister of Home Affairs, 1999 (3) SA 280 (CC) 16 (S. Afr.). The Court expressly
rejected the government's arguments based on costs, scarce resources, a desire to appear
tough on crime, and retribution. Id. at IT 45, 49, 56, and 66. Instead, the Court reasoned
that disqualifying prisoners from voting was inappropriate and inconsistent with enhancing
respect for the law and ensuring appropriate punishment, because it profoundly affects a
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that "[t]he vote of each and every citizen is a badge of dignity and
personhood. Quite literally, it says that everybody counts."96
Chapter 2 of South Africa's Constitution sets forth a Bill of Rights,
which contains, among many other enumerated positive rights, the
right to vote. Specifically, Section 19(3)(a) provides that "[e]very
adult citizen has the right to vote in elections for any legislative
body established in terms of the Constitution, and to do so in
secret."'
Most recently, in Roach v. AEC and Commonwealth of
Australia, the High Court of Australia held that sections 7 and 24
of the Constitution, which require that the Houses of Parliament
be "directly chosen by the people," enshrine the right to vote and
that only a "substantial reason," which did not include
imprisonment for a period of less than three years, may limit this
right.98 Specifically, the Court reasoned that limitations on the
right to vote must be "appropriate and adapted" or
"proportionate" to the substantial reason proffered by government
actors.9 By this calculus, the Court upheld the validity of the law,
providing that prisoners serving a sentence of three years or longer
are not entitled to vote."'0
In 1974, in one of the earliest U.S. cases concerning criminal
disfranchisement and constitutional rights-Richardson v.
Ramirez-the Supreme Court of the United States decided an
equal protection challenge to a state's criminal disfranchisement
policy, holding that it did not violate the U.S. Constitution.i0 As
noted above, the U.S. Constitution does not contain a positive
right to vote. 102 Accordingly, the Richardson Court did not have to
reconcile the practice of criminal disfranchisement with a positive
right to vote, but rather reconciled it with the Equal Protection
Clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the
fact that section 2 of the Amendment provides for criminal
person's self-respect and relegates him or her to the status of second-class citizen. Id. at 1
80.
96 Id. 28 (quoting August & Another, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) 1 17 (S. Afr.)).
97 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 19(3)(a).
98 Roach v. AEC and Commonwealth of Austl. (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162 IT 7, 155.
99 Id. 1 85, 95.
100 Id. T 95, 105.
101 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
102 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reaffirming the principle that there is no
constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States); United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (declaring that the Fifteenth Amendment does not
confer the right of suffrage but rather protects against interference in voting).
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disfranchisement for "participation in rebellion, or other crime,"
the Court held that the practice is constitutionally permissible.03
Each source country of the aforementioned criminal
disfranchisement opinions is a constitutional democracy. The
constitutions of South Africa and Canada both contain a positive
right to vote. Australia's Constitution does not have a positive
right to vote; instead, Section 41 states:
No adult person who has or acquires a right to vote at elections
for the more numerous Houses of the Parliament of a State
shall, while the right continues, be prevented by any law of the
Commonwealth from voting at elections for either House of
the Parliament of the Commonwealth.104
Other sections of the Australian Constitution require that
members of the House of Representatives be chosen directly by
the people,"os and that, until the Commonwealth Parliament
otherwise provides, the qualification of electors of members of the
House of Representatives shall be in each state prescribed by the
law of the state as the qualification for electors of the state
Parliament. 106
The significance of the international precedent on the issue of
prisoner voting rights was not lost on Ghana's Supreme Court. It
referred to these cases throughout its opinions to compare and
contrast the clarity of Article 42.107 Situating Ghana within this
international framework, its Chief Justice forcefully reiterated a
commitment to constitutionalism: "I have based the call on Ghana
to join the League of Nations who place a high premium on
prisoners' fundamental right to vote, not on sentimentality or
some other non legal reasoning, but on the just requirements of
103 Id. at 42-43 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2). Sager offers a metadoctrinal
analysis of Richardson v. Ramirez in Fair Measure. See Sager, supra note 1, at 1241-42. In
particular, he uses Richardson as an exemplar of the underenforcement of a constitutional
norm-in this case equal protection-"on a purely analytical basis" as opposed to
"institutional perceptions." Id. at 1241. See also generally Mitchell N. Berman, Managing
Gerrymandering, 83 TEx. L. REV. 781 (2005) (applying the distinction between decision
rules and operative propositions to gerrymandering claims).
104 AUSTL. CONST. § 41.
105 Id. § 24.
106 Id. § 30.
107 OcanseylCHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 22-23 (citing Roach
v. AEC and Commonwealth of Austl. (2007) 233 C.L.R. 162); id. at 34 (citing Sauv6 v.
Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 2002 SCC 68. and August &
Another, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
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the Constitution, the Supreme Law of this land as it stands.""os
What is most instructive about the Ocansey/CHURCIL decision,
as well as the international grouping of cases extending voting
rights to incarcerated persons of which it now forms part, is the
difference that an express, positive right to vote makes in the
enforcement analysis. Indeed, the express articulation of
fundamental rights, particularly those that relate to the operation
of democracy, such as the right to vote, is an important
cornerstone to enforcement in emerging and maturing
democracies because it permits constitutionalism and adherence to
the rule of law to prevail more readily over shifting normative
judgments.
C. Non-Judicial Underenforcement of the Right to Vote
Underenforcement can result not only from judicial omission
but also from a lack of legislative or administrative enforcement.
Unlike judicial underenforcement, which may occur legitimately
due to judicial restraints and questions of justiciability,
underenforcement by non-judicial actors does not typically
warrant similar justification." In addition to the direct
consequences of underenforcement, the tangible threat posed by
the underenforcement of constitutional norms by non-judicial
actors is the deference accorded to the legislative and
administrative interpretations of the norm, which may later limit
judicial review. Furthermore, even when there is judicial
enforcement, when resources are scarce, legislative and
administrative actors are more susceptible to making enforcement
determinations based on suspect factors, including social status.
Both the legislative and administrative contexts of Ghana's
underenforcement of the right to vote underscore this point. How
each branch of government responds to the judiciary's new
demand for a constitutional instrument to ensure enforcement of
the right to vote will test Ghana's maturation as a democracy.
108 Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 39.
109 See Roosevelt, supra note 2, at 197 (noting that "many of the reasons that can be
offered for judicial underenforcement do not justify its practice by nonjudicial actors").
But see generally Fallon, supra note 9 (extending to non-judicial actors his "permissible
disparity thesis," whereby underenforcement by judicial actors is excused for want of
judicially manageable standards).
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1. Legislative Underenforcement of the Right to Vote
The Ocansey/CHURCIL decision rendered null and void the
subsidiary legislation that resulted in the legislative
underenforcement of the right to vote established under Article
42. However, to understand fully how such legislative
underenforcement operated successfully in a maturing
constitutional democracy, we explore the legislative landscape in
Ghana concerning the right to vote that predated the
Ocansey/CHURCIL decision.
The legislative underenforcement of Article 42 was twofold.
First, there was subsidiary legislation that specifically undermined
the force and scope of Article 42. Second, the legislature amended
this subsidiary legislation to ensure that voting rights would extend
to a particular category of Ghana's citizens-who were also denied
the right to vote by the EC-but failed to include GICs as
beneficiaries of this legislation. This further undermined the force
of Article 42 by enacting legislation to "grant" rights that Article
42 already establishes. I discuss both of these aspects of legislative
underenforcement and the Ocansey/CHURCIL court's treatment
of these issues below.
PNDCL 284 requires that voters be "resident in the polling
division" in which they seek to be registered, and "not otherwise
disqualified to be registered as a voter by any law for the time
being in force."" PNDCL 284 further provided that a place of
detainment cannot establish residency for purposes of voter
registration. Specifically, this subsection states that "[a] person ...
who is detained in legal custody in any place shall not be treated as
resident there for the purposes of [voter registration.]."111  This
section contemplated that sane, adult citizens who are detained in
legal custody may not use their institution as a residence for
registration purposes; however, it did not affirmatively restrict
GICs from registering at their prior legal residence. As a technical
matter, however, because of another provision, only a narrow
group of individuals in such institutions would be permitted to
register under these laws. PNDCL 284 section 7(4) imposed a
temporal requirement on residency for registration purposes: "A
person shall not be deemed to be resident in a polling division if he
has been absent from his place of abode for a continuous period of
110 Representation of the People Law, 1992, (PNDCL 284) § 7(1)(d).
Ill Id. § 7(5) (emphasis added).
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six months ending on the qualifying date."112 Accordingly, only
GICs in legal custody for fewer than six months at the time of the
qualifying period for registration would have been eligible to
register to vote using their prior legal residence under the Act.
Read together, PNDCL 284 sections 7(4) and 7(5) combined to
restrict the franchise from GICs because of residency
requirements that most GICs could not satisfy.
Of the EC regulations, only the 1995 Registration Regulations
have direct bearing on the matter of criminal disfranchisement in
Ghana. 13 Of particular relevance is Part I, section 5.3 of the
Registration of Voters' Public Elections (Registration
Regulations) Act, 1995 CI 12 (PERR Act), which requires that
otherwise eligible voters reside or ordinarily reside in an electoral
area and reserves the EC's discretion to designate registration
areas based on "suitability" and convenience to voters. 114 This law
and PNDCL 284 form the legal basis of Ghana's criminal
disfranchisement policies. Rather than expand or define the
qualitative right to vote, PNDCL 284 and Part I, section 5.3 of the
PERR Act restate the constitutional requirements for voting
eligibility and regulate the procedural aspects of the right by
112 Id. § 7(4).
113 The EC also promulgated the 1996 Ghanaian Public Elections Regulations and the
2000 Political Parties Law as part of its lawmaking authority under the Constitution.
Public Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations Act, 1995; The Political Parties Law
Act 574, (2000) available at http://www.ec.gov.gh/nodell7?q=node/27. These laws have no
direct bearing on the disfranchisement of GICs.
114 The full text of the regulation provides:
Regulation 1-Qualification for Registration
A person who -
(a) is a citizen of Ghana;
(b) is of 18 years of age or above;
(c) is of sound mind;
(d) is resident or ordinarily resident in an electoral area; and
(e) is not prohibited by any law in force from registering as a voter
is entitled to have his name included in a register of voters for the
electoral area during a period set aside for the registration of
voters.
Regulation 2-Registration Centres and Electoral Areas
(1) The Commission shall designate any place it considers appropriate as
a registrationcentre for the purpose of registering voters.
(2) In designating a place as a registration centre, the Commission shall
take into account-
the suitability of the place for use as a polling station on election
day; and the convenience of prospective applicants for
registration.
Public Elections (Registration of Voters) Regulations Act, 1995 (CI 12) (Ghana).
456 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18:425
imposing residency and domicile requirements. Importantly,
however, nothing in these provisions restricts registration or voting
eligibility based upon criminal status per se. Indeed, on the
specific matter of criminal disfranchisement, there is no direct
mention of voting by incarcerated persons in the Constitution,
PNDCLs, EC regulations, or any other body of law. The only
language that remotely approximates a restriction of the franchise
based on criminal conviction is set forth in PNDCL 284 section
9(21), which provides that, when an election is contested by an
unsuccessful candidate on the grounds that he receives a majority
of the lawful votes, the EC or such other body as the court may
determine shall conduct a recount of the votes and strike, among
others, "the vote of a person who has been disqualified from
voting at the elections because of a conviction for a corrupt or
illegal practice or because of a report made by a court under this
Law.""15 However, even this language does not require the
blanket restriction of the franchise for persons with criminal
convictions, under which Ghanaian elections currently operate.
Specifically, PNDCL 284 section 21(e) effectively invalidates the
votes of persons who have been affirmatively disqualified from
voting because of a conviction for a "corrupt or illegal practice"
which may or may not encompass all criminal convictions.116
By contrast, section 9(2) of PNDCL 284 contains specific
temporal restrictions concerning persons with criminal convictions
and their ability to qualify as a member of Parliament:
A person shall not be qualified to be a member of Parliament if
he-
(c) has been convicted -
(i) for treason or for an offence involving the security of
the State, fraud, dishonesty or moral turpitude; or
(ii) for any other offence punishable by death or by a
sentence of not less than ten years imprisonment; or
115 PNDCL 284 § 21(e) (emphasis added).
116 Id. "Corrupt practice" is defined by PNDCL 284 section 50 as "the offence of
personation, bribery, treating or undue influence[,J or of aiding, abetting, counseling [sic]
or attempting the commission of such offence." Id. § 50. The term "illegal practice" is not
defined in the statute. The only reference to post-incarceration disfranchisement occurs in
PNDCL 284 sections 27, 28, 29, and 36, which provide that persons who commit election
offences in particular shall be subject to a substantial monetary fine or a prison term of up
to two years "and shall, for a period of five years from the date of the expiration of his
term of imprisonment be disqualified from being registered as a voter or voting at an
election." Id. §§ 27-29, 36.
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(iii) for an offence relating to, or connected with[,] public
elections under a law in Ghana at any time ... 117
The Act further states that such persons shall not be so
disqualified if a period of at least ten years has passed or unless
pardoned.1 8 Furthermore, although no law in Ghana compels it,
voter participation is firmly urged upon all eligible Ghanaian
citizens."i9
Far from demonstrating that GICs may lawfully be denied the
right to vote, the laws and policies set forth above, when read
together, suggest that the people of Ghana have considered
restrictions on political participation based on criminal status and
have adopted them expressly in establishing qualifications for
Members of Parliament, but not with respect to eligibility for voter
registration. The Ocansey/CHURCIL decision makes a similar
point:
It bears emphasis that the Constitution did not set down the
residency criteria; it (the residency criteria) is the product of
the subordinate law PNDCL 284. But the people of Ghana
adopted and enacted for themselves a democratic regime of
constitutionally guaranteed adult suffrage for all Ghanaians,
save only persons under eighteen years of age and of unsound
mind. We crafted for ourselves a Constitution that set out its
own limitations on the right to vote and perhaps having regard
to the value it places on the right in question, did not cede any
of its authority to either the EC or some other authority to add
further to the list of who shall have the right to vote.120
Article 42 does not require voters to reside in a specific
constituency or impose any other residency requirement in order
to vote. Rather, Article 42 grants the right of universal adult
suffrage to "every citizen" of sound mind. Indeed, both the literal
117 Id. § 9(2).
118 Id. § 9(5). In addition, Articles 62, 79, and 94 of the Constitution prohibit persons
convicted of certain crimes from holding office as President of the Republic of Ghana,
Minister of State, or Member of Parliament, respectively. GHANA CONST. 1992 arts. 62,
79, 94. While the disqualification from eligibility from these offices may not present the
same concerns for GICs as it does for other citizens-since the fact of their incarceration
may, by itself, provide an independent basis for disqualification of GICs-it is worth
noting the significance that voter registration is accorded in the Constitution as further
evidence that encumbrances placed on it may contravene the Constitution's letter and
spirit.
119 See Electoral Commission of Ghana, Registration & Voting, http://www.ec.gov.gh/
node/20 (last visited Aug. 28,2009) ("Voting is both a right and a responsibility.").
120 See Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, C.J.), at 22.
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and contextual interpretations of the relevant laws and policies
make clear that the force of Article 42's provision of universal
adult suffrage had not been circumscribed by subsidiary
legislation, but the fair measure of this provision remained
underenforced as a result of this legislation.12t
121 For example, Botswana's Constitution states:
Every person who is registered in any constituency as a voter for the purposes
of elections of the Elected Members of the National Assembly shall, unless he
is disqualified by Parliament from voting in such elections on the grounds of
his having been convicted of an offence in connection with the elections or on
the grounds of his having been reported guilty of such an offence by the court
trying an election petition or on the grounds of his being in lawful custody at
the date of the election, be entitled so to vote in that constituency in
accordance with the provisions made by or under a law in that behalf; and no
other person may so vote.
BOTS. CONST., 1966 § 67(5) (emphasis added). Similarly, Romania's Constitution
provides:
Every citizen having attained the age of eighteen up to or on the election day
shall have the right to vote.... The mentally deficient or alienated, laid
under interdiction, as well as persons disenfranchised by a final decision of the
court cannot vote.
ROM. CONsT. 2003 art. 36 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Chile, the right to vote is
suspended "[wihen the person is being tried for a crime deserving afflictive punishment or
for a crime that the law should define as a terrorist conduct." CHILE CONST. 1980 art. 16.
Other constitutions contain less specific bases for exclusion. For example, the
Constitutions of Angola and Nigeria both contain some language of disqualification based
on deprivation of rights. In Angola the right (and duty) to vote is expressed as follows:
It shall be the right and duty of all citizens aged over 18, other than those
legally deprived of political and civil rights, to take an active part in public life,
to vote and stand for election to any State body, and to fulfill their offices with
full dedication to the cause of the Angolan nation.
ANGL. CONST. 1992 art. 28 (emphasis added). Nigeria's basis for criminal
disfranchisement is similarly worded:
(1) A person shall be qualified for registration as a voter if such a person:
(a) is a citizen of Nigeria;
(b) has attained the age of eighteen years;
(c) is ordinarily resident, works in, originates from the Local
Government/Area Council or Ward covered by the registration centre;
(d) presents himself to the registration officers of the Commission for
registration as a voter; and
(e) is not subject to any legal incapacity to vote under any law, rule or
regulations in force in Nigeria.
ELECTORAL ACT 2002, PART I, § 2(1) (NIGERIA), available at http://www.nigeria-
law.org/ElectoralAct2002.htm (emphasis added). This sampling of constitutional
provisions provides an example of affirmative bases for denying voting rights or
establishing voter qualifications based on criminal conviction.
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Another factor contributing to Article 42's underenforcement
was the indirect attack on its validity by virtue of the passage of
the Representation of the People (Amendment) Law (ROPAL) in
2006. Ghana passed ROPAL to amend its election laws and
enable Ghanaian citizens living abroad to register to vote.122
Following its passage, concerns over logistics, financial and human
resources, partisanship, and general implementation prevented
ROPAL's enforcement in subsequent elections.12
Notwithstanding this administrative underenforcement, ROPAL's
passage indicates that there is steadfast concern and engagement
by the Ghanaian citizenry concerning electoral participation and
democracy.
ROPAL's text provides that the statute's purpose is to
"enable Ghanaians resident abroad to register to vote in public
elections and referenda." 124  As a technical matter, ROPAL
supersedes that portion of PNDCL 284 that limits voter
registration to citizens who maintain a residence in Ghana. The
other legal byproduct of ROPAL is that it established that the
Constitution extends the right to vote to all age-appropriate
Ghanaian citizens of sane mind, regardless of domicile.125
ROPAL's potential reformative impact on the electoral
process in Ghana is manifold. First, once enforced, ROPAL will
transform the demographics of the current electorate by
permitting Ghanaian diasporans who hail from nearly every
country in the world to cast ballots in public domestic elections
and referenda processes. Second, prior to the Ocansey/CHURCIL
decision, ROPAL's passage called into question any extension of
the right to vote beyond those groups of citizens traditionally
122 REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE AcT OF 2006, Act 699 (amending PNDCL 284
to enable Ghanaians resident abroad to register to vote in public elections and referenda).
123 Representation of the People (Amendment) Act 2006 (Ghana) [hereinafter
ROPALj. There was no shortage of rancor and controversy in the debate surrounding
ROPAL's passage. In fact, three days before ROPAL was initially passed, twenty
Ghanaians were injured in a demonstration against the bill when Ghana's police force
used excessive force to diffuse the protest. Linda Akrasi, Opposition MPs Return to
Parliament After 14-Day Protest, GHANAIAN CHRON., Mar. 3, 2006.
124 ROPAL, supra note 122. ROPAL amends section 8 of PNDCL 284 as follows: "A
person who is a citizen of Ghana resident outside the Republic is entitled to be registered
as a voter if the person satisfies the requirements for registration prescribed by law other
than those relating to residence in a polling division." Id.
125 Robert Bates, There is Economic Growth but the Structures of Africa's Economies
Remain Unaltered, BOSTON REV., May/June 2008, at 13 ("Remittances rank as the
country's second largest source of foreign earnings, less than the gains from gold exports,
but greater than those from coco.").
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permitted to vote absent legislative amendment. Indeed, in the
process leading up to the passage of ROPAL, the presumed need
for the amendment was questioned by some as an affront to
constitutionalism and ultimately justified as a matter of political
expediency rather than legal necessity.
The right to vote and to be registered to vote does not come
from or depend on legislative grace, the reported amendment
to our existing election statute introduced in Parliament,
ostensibly for the purpose of enabling Ghanaians abroad to
vote, is really a re-invention of the wheel. In fact, Parliament's
action may have created the mistaken impression that the
nonresident Ghanaian's right to vote is a gift or privilege that
can come only from an Act of Parliament. That is not so.
However, because the EC persists in excluding absentee
Ghanaians from voting, the alternative to legislative action is a
constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court. Given the
fact that the Electoral Commission appears these days to have
been empowered to do whatever pleases it in whatever way it
chooses ... it is probably better, if only to avoid all doubt, for
Parliament to affirm by legislation what is already there, in
black and white, in article 42 of the Constitution.126
While the specific text of ROPAL does not bear directly
upon the residency requirement that locks GICs out of the
electoral process, it has expanded the overall definition of the
Ghanaian electorate and has put the question of whether residency
is a voting prerequisite squarely within the scrutiny of the public
and Parliament. In some ways, the principle of universal adult
suffrage for which Article 42 stands is strengthened by ROPAL.
Indeed, in enacting ROPAL, the supremacy of Article 42 was
expressly acknowledged by the Attorney General and Minister of
Justice:
The right to vote in an election is an entrenched provision of
the Constitution. Article 42 of the Constitution empowers
every citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of
sound mind to register as a voter and vote in public elections
and referenda. This right is not restricted to citizens resident in
the country because the reference is to a citizen without
qualification. Furthermore, section 2(1) of the Political Parties
Act, 2002 (Act 574) provides that every citizen of voting age
has the right to participate in political activity intended to
126 Playing Politics With the Enfranchisement of the Wrongfully Disenfranchised,
DEMOCRACY WATCH 4 (Ghana Ctr. for Democratic Dev.), Mar. 2004, at 1.
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influence the composition and policies of government, the least
of this participation is the right to vote.127
Despite this recognition, the passage of ROPAL effectively
bypassed the opportunity for judicial and administrative
enforcement, and potentially undermined the force of the
Constitution as supreme law, absent reinforcing legislation. To be
sure, because the matter of voting rights for Ghanaian diasporans
was so politically charged, the absence of legislative process to
enforce their voting rights might have proved more damaging to
Ghana's stability than would have direct administrative
enforcement of the Constitution. Arguably, despite Article 42's
guarantees, the importance of ROPAL is underscored by its
implication of broader, more fundamental questions concerning
the definition and breadth of citizenship in ways that are not
present in the debate over GICs' voting rights.
Importantly, despite its superfluousness, ROPAL did not spell
defeat for a broad reading of Article 42 of the Constitution that
would grant universal voting rights to all Ghanaian adult citizens
of sane mind, absent legislative amendment. To the contrary, the
Ocansey/CHURCIL decision acknowledged that ROPAL was
indeed an unnecessary legal instrument in light of Article 42's
breadth.128
2. Administrative Underenforcement of the Right to Vote
Judicial and legislative underenforcement notwithstanding,
Ghana's systemic electoral inconsistency with respect to criminal
disfranchisement originated in the administrative
127 Memorandum from J. Ayikoi Otoo, Attorney-Gen. & Minister for Justice,
Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill (Apr. 19,2005).
128 Specifically, Justice Dotse declared:
In view in the analysis that has been made in relation to the wide nature of
article 42 of the Constitution 1992, there is no doubt in my mind that every
sane citizen of Ghana wherever located or settled, who is eighteen years and
above is entitled to be registered for the purposes of voting in public elections
and referenda in Ghana, in my mind therefore, there was really no need for
the passage of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act 2006....
(The Act] is a surplusage since without it, Ghanaians in the diaspora already
had the right to be registered.
Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Dotse, J.S.C.), at 29. It is uncertain what
effect, if any, the Ocansey/CHURCIL decision will have on the force of ROPAL as law.
Because ROPAL was not the subject of the litigation, and a majority of the court did not
rule on its validity, it will presumably remain in effect as confirming that Ghanaian
diasporans fall within Article 42's purview.
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underenforcement of Article 42. As noted above, the EC is
authorized by the Constitution, and the President appoints its
commissioners.129 Despite Article 42's clear and unqualified terms,
self-executing nature, and broad interpretation by Ghana's highest
court, the EC had not enforced this constitutional provision to
grant the right to vote to GICs over eighteen years of age and of
sound mind. While the EC has acknowledged the expansive
nature of Article 42, it had, until recently, nonetheless refused to
register GICs to vote or otherwise allow them voting privileges.
To justify its acts and omissions in this regard, the EC relied on the
subsidiary legal authority, discussed above, which was either
enacted by a parliament that preceded the 1992 Constitution or
developed by the EC appurtenant to its administrative authority
over elections under the 1992 Constitution.'3 0 The EC also
relegated all authority for constitutional enforcement on this
matter to the judiciary.i'
Like judicial and legislative underenforcement, administrative
underenforcement holds particular consequences and concerns. In
particular, administrative actors may be susceptible to
impermissible influences and corruption absent strict regulation.
In addition, in the formal symbiotic relationship between
lawmaking and administrative enforcement -whereby courts defer
in part to administrative and legislative interpretation and intent-
underenforcement by non-judicial actors threatens to seal off all
potential avenues for constitutional enforcement.
129 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
130 Specifically, Article 45 of the 1992 Constitution provides that the EC shall have the
following functions:
(a) to compile the register of voters and revise it at such periods as may
be determined by law;
(b) to demarcate the electoral boundaries for both national and local
government elections;
(c) to conduct and supervise all public elections and referenda;...
(d) to educate the people on the electoral process an its purpose;
(e) to undertake programmes for the expansion of the registration of voters;
and
(f) to perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 45. Article 46 of the 1992 Constitution further provides that "in
the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission, [sic] shall not be subject to the
direction or control of any person or authority." Id. art. 46.
131 See, e.g., S. Makalo, Prisoners to Vote in Ghana, AFROL. NEws, May 13, 2008,
http://www.afrol.comlarticles/28889 (quoting EC Chairman Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan,
"The commission is not against the right of prisoners to vote. Once the courts say we
should go and set up registration centres and polling stations at the prisons, we will go.").
20101 FAIR MEASURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
To be fair, in light of ROPAL and the failure of the judiciary
and legislature to take up the issue of voting rights for GICs until
very recently, the EC, as an administrative agency, understandably
might have perceived itself to be in a precarious enforcement
position. However, the positive nature of the right, coupled with
the EC's election administration charge, provides support for the
EC's power to enforce the fair measure of the right to vote.
Certainly, these factors indicate the EC's ability and obligation to
seek clarification of any conflict of law that appears to narrow the
constitutional norm that the EC is duty bound to enforce as a body
established under the Constitution by executive appointment.
Indeed, the EC's reliance on PNDCLs and self-promulgated
statutory regulations as a justification for the disfranchisement of
GICs squarely called into question the hierarchy of Ghanaian law,
the subsidiary legislation process,132 and respect for the rule of law.
To the extent that there was any question concerning the
supremacy of Article 42 vis-A-vis PNDCL 284, the Supreme Court
had spoken expressly on this issue as a generally matter: "Article
1(2) of the Constitution, 1992 says that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. It precedes any other law including
PNDCL 284."133 Ocansey/CHURCIL now firmly establishes that
this principle applies to the specific context of criminal
disfranchisement.134
Despite the significant constitutional development resulting
from the Ocansey/CHURCIL decision, the question of
administrative underenforcement remains open as Ghana waits for
the EC to fulfill the judicial mandate to create "the necessary
regulatory framework"' 3 to enable registration of and voting by
GICs. Faced with an unequivocal judicial proclamation that its
practice of disfranchising GICs lacks viable legal justification
under the Constitution, the EC must now act carefully and
swiftly13 6 to correct the longstanding underenforcement under its
132 "Without a system to subject regulations to substantive scrutiny, the public may be
adversely affected by regulations that have been improperly promulgated or ill-considered
but nonetheless have become law." Stanton, supra note 58, at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
For a well-considered critique and comparative analysis of Ghana's subsidiary legislation
process, see generally id.
133 Republic v. Electoral Commission and Another; Ex Parte Amoo [1997-981 1 G.L.R.
938,957-58 (High Court, Ghana).
134 See Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18.
135 Id. (opinion of Dotse, J.S.C.), at 32.
136 Id. (opinion of Date-Bah, J.S.C.), at 18 (ordering the EC to exercise its regulatory
power "to make an appropriate constitutional instrument enabling prisoners to exercise
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authority. Understanding the multiple causes and sources of
constitutional underenforcement within Ghana's broader legal
framework underscores the extent and complexity of
underenforcement in a maturing democracy. Understanding the
political context of this underenforcement underscores the
potential harm to democratization as a whole.
III. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF UNDERENFORCEMENT OF THE
RIGHT TO VOTE IN GHANA
By definition, metadoctrinalism examines the fact of
underenforcement and the doctrinal consequences that flow from
it, but does not emphasize the political or social context of
underenforcement. If underenforcement and its consequences are
to be weighed, challenged, and fully understood, it is important
also to consider the factors that produce underenforcement,
including the historical background and contemporary social and
political contexts. My analysis of Ghana as a case study suggests
that underenforcement in a mature, stable democracy, while still
problematic, does not potentiate the same consequences
concerning the rule of law and democracy as in an emerging or
maturing democracy.
It is particularly significant to explore the political and
administrative context in which constitutional underenforcement
arose in Ghana, because it is a context common to many newer
democracies that have traded military or other undemocratic or
illiberal regimes for constitutional democracy in recent decades.
Moreover, having established that there was no legal justification
for the practice of criminal disfranchisement in Ghana, it is
important to view the practice within the broader context of
Ghana's modern democratic development in order to understand
more fully the potential impact that continued underenforcement
could have on a maturing democracy and the potential for judicial
enforcement to yield a complete remedy.
Ghana's trajectory in pursuit of constitutionalism is shared by
many emerging democracies with a history of military dictatorship
and political unrest. These democracies have abandoned
their right to vote" as soon as practicable and within no more than twelve months of the
date of the order).
137 See H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on
an African Political Paradox in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS
IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (1993) (analyzing the role of constitutions in shaping
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military dictatorships and adopted liberal constitutions, but they
must still grapple with the entrenchment of illiberal extra-
constitutional norms among judicial and non-judicial actors.
Ghana, as a successful democracy on a continent of compromised
political regimes, has much at stake-both nationally and
regionally-in continuing its democratic development. In Africa, a
democratic revolution that began in the post-colonial era and
gained traction in subsequent decades has been slowly
transforming the continent's political landscape.' 8 Coined the
"third wave of democracy" by political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington,'39 the rapid proliferation of democracies from 1974 to
the present has spurred an incipient entrenchment of democracy in
Africa. According to Freedom House, a non-profit, non-
governmental organization that issues an index of "democratic
freedoms" with assigned values from one to seven (for the most to
least democratic nations, respectively), most African countries'
indexes averaged around six until the past two decades."o This
signified that democracy was nearly non-existent, despite
commonplace democratic structures and election processes.''
Much of this democratic development has occurred simultaneously
with-and, arguably, as a product of-the rise of constitutionalism
in Africa."' Ghana's democratic development is consistent with
this story.
government and power in the African political context, including the challenges of
constitutionalism in Central African Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria,
Swaziland, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).
138 Prempeh, Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival," supra note 22, at 473 ("Neither
democracy nor constitutionalism is a new term on the agenda of postcolonial Africa.").
139 See Samuel Huntington, Democracy's Third Wave, J. DEMOCRACY, Spring 1991, at
12, (identifying and defining the then-current era of democratic transitions as the "third
wave" of democracy in modern history); see also Samuel Huntington, THE THIRD WAVE:
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 13-26 (1991) (defining the first,
second, and third waves of democratization).
140 See Freedom in the World: 2008, Freedom House, Sept. 2008,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/templatecfm?page=411&year=2008; see Edward Miguel, Is
It Africa's Turn?: Progress in the World's Poorest Region, BOSTON REV., May/June 2007,
at 7.
141 Bates, supra note 125, at 13. See Freedom House, Electoral Democracies 2008,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=411&year=2008 (last visited Aug. 17,
2009).
142 See Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1281 n.183. For a detailed
summary of the trajectory of constitutionalism in Africa, see Prempeh, Africa's
"Constitutionalism Revival," supra note 22, at 471, 473-84 ("The recent democratic
openings in Africa have been backstopped by constitutional changes.").
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A. The Path to Democracy
Since the early 1990s, Ghana has stood out from African and
other nations for its political stability, economic progress, and
social development.143  Despite some stumbling on the road to
institutionalizing its democracy, including a twelve-year military
autocracy, Ghana has consistently advanced toward its goal of
constitutional democracy since its first democratic elections in
1951.144
Ghana's overall trajectory is one familiar to the majority of
countries on the African continent-one of complex, traditional
legal and political systems, followed by foreign occupation,
colonization, emancipation, and, finally, development toward
democratic goals "in fits and starts." 145 Ghana gained its freedom
from British rule through political resistance and popular protests,
earning it the lauded title of "The Black Star of Africa" and its
143 See, e.g., Robert Mattes & E. Gyimah-Boadi, The Quality of Two Liberal
Democracies in Africa: Ghana and South Africa 1 (Oct. 10-11, 2003) (initial draft,
presented at Conference on "The Quality of Democracy: Improvement of Subversion?",
Ctr. on Democracy, Dev. and Rule of Law and European Forum, Inst. for Int'l Studies,
Stanford Univ.), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edulpubs/20442/QoD-paper_Mattes_-
Gyimah-Boadi.pdf ("While the Third Wave of Democracy swept through many African
countries in the 1990s, South Africa and Ghana stand out as two of the continent's real
success stories politically."). In addition to these scholarly perspectives, popular sentiment
suggests that Ghana will serve as a template and yardstick for other African nations living
the democratic experiment. See, e.g., Lord Aikins Adusei, Did the African Union Get
Ghana's Message?, http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/did-the-african-union-get-
ghanas-message-726487.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2009) ("The recent elections in Ghana
have been hailed as a successful African story. The praises, admirations[,] and messages
of commendations coming from all corners of the globe [are] an indication that the world
is hoping for a change in Africa. It is also an indication that the world is expecting
something different, different from the way things are done all the time on the
continent."); Ghana Elections Set Pace for West Africa, Says IU Faculty Member Who
Served as Monitor, IU NEWS ROOM, http://newsinfo.iu.edu/news/page/normal/9593.html
(last visited Aug. 20,2009) (quoting Amos Sawyer, a research scholar at the Workshop on
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University at Bloomington: "Ghana
continues to set the pace for West Africa."); Commonwealth Observer Group, Ghana
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 37, (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/187673/FileName/GHANA2008ELECTIONS-
COGREPORTFINAL.pdf (stating that Ghana's maturing democracy has become a good
reference point for the African continent and the Commonwealth as a whole).
144 See generally GHANA: ONE DECADE OF THE LIBERAL STATE, supra note 39 (a
series of essays regarding Ghana's first decade as a liberal democracy).
145 See Christopher Fomunyoh, Democratization in Fits and Starts, J. DEMOCRACY, July
2001, at 37, 49; Marc Lacey, By Fits and Starts, Africa's Brand of Democracy Emerges,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,2005, at A4.
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status as the first independent African nation.146 Following this
significant milestone, Ghana struggled through a series of
intermittent attempts at democratic government and military
regimes for nearly forty years.147 In 1992, following nearly a
decade of military rule by movement leader John Rawlings,
Ghanaians elected Rawlings, who represented the PNDC,
president in the country's second presidential multi-party election
since its 1957 emancipation. 148 That same year, Ghana adopted its
current constitution.149
Since that time, Ghana's growth as a stable constitutional
democracy has been noteworthy.5 0 There have been relatively
few instances of domestic conflict."s' In addition, Ghana has
adopted the traditional markers of a constitutional democracy: the
right to vote, separation of powers, free and fair elections, freedom
of the press, and respect for the rule of law.152 The first democratic
transfer of power occurred between Rawlings and John Kufuor of
the National Patriotic Party (NPP)Isa in 2000, following Ghana's
146 Indeed, most of Ghana's fifty-year existence has been dominated by military and
autocratic one-party regimes. See generally Kwame A. Ninsin, One Party and Military
Regimes in GHANA'S TRANSITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE: PROCEEDINGS OF A
SEMINAR ORGANISED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF
GHANA, LEGON 21-32 (1991).
147 Among these was the controversial 31st of December 1981 Revolution in Ghana, a
national women's movement headed by the wife of the head of state, Nana Konadu
Agyeman Rawlings. The 31st of December Movement is largely credited with setting in
motion the national democratic transformation that is manifest today. See KEVIN
SHILLINGTON, GHANA AND THE RAWLINGS FACTOR 157 (1992) (arguing that the
December 31st Movement catalyzed the PNDC's promulgation of laws addressing women
rights).
148 McCaskie, supra note 39, at 4479.
149 See generally GHANA CONST. 1992.
150 See Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1290 ("[T]he quality of
constitutionalism in Ghana has improved consistently and appreciably over the ten-year
period since its current constitution came into effect.").
151 See, e.g., BENJAMIN A. TALTON, POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE: THE KONKOMBA
STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL EQUALITY (2010); Benjamin A. Talton, The Past and Present
in Ghana's Ethnic Conflicts: British Colonial Policy and Konkomba Agency, 1930-1951, 38
J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 192, 192 (2003).
152 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 8-10 (2007) (summarizing the mandates of
constitutionalism); DAVID BEETHAM, DEFINING AND MEASURING DEMOCRACY 29-30
(1994) (describing the components of democratic society).
153 The NPP is one of the two leading political parties in Ghana, in addition to the
NDC. Minion K.C. Morrison, Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics: A Path
to Democratic Consolidation, 36 J.COMP. POLITICS 421,438 (2004). Other major political
parties include the Convention People's Party (CPP), Democratic Freedom Party (DFP),
Democratic People's Party (DPP), People's National Convention (PNC), and the Reform
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third democratic presidential election.' In the final weeks of
2008, Ghana successfully cleared its second democratic transfer of
political power after administering widely scrutinized general and
run-off presidential elections.' 5 This "double alternation," the
democratic process through which governance is twice transferred
between competing political regimes, earned Ghana its recent
designation as a "maturing democracy. "156
B. The Political Structure and Electoral System
Ghana's representative, constitutional democracy closely
mirrors the British parliamentary system. Ghana's elections are
administered and regulated by the EC.57 The EC was established
by Articles 43, 44, and 45 of the Constitution, as well as the
Electoral Commission Act (Act 451) of 1993.158 The EC is
comprised of seven members appointed by the President-one
chairman, two deputy chairmen, and four other members.5 9 The
EC has constitutionally-derived administrative authority over the
conduct of elections, as well as regulatory authority of elections
through the issuance of rules and regulations.16o Importantly, the
Patriotic Democrats (RPD). See Electoral Commission of Ghana, Registered Political
Parties, ww.ec.gov.ghlnode/28 (last visited Aug. 28, 2009).
154 Ghana has had presidential elections in each of the following years: 1992, 1996, 2000,
2004, and 2008. E. Gyimah-Boadi, Another Step Forward for Ghana, J. DEMOCRACY,
Apr. 2009, at 138.
155 In the Annals of the Ghanaian Elections, DEMOCRACY WATCH 8 (Ghana Ctr. for
Democratic Dev.), May 2009 at 1. See generally Heinz Jockers, Dirk Kohnert, & Paul
Nugent, The Successful Ghana Election of2008: A Convenient Myth?: Ethnicity in Ghana's
Elections Revisited (German Inst. of Global & Area Stud., Working Paper Number 109,
2009), available at http://repec.gigahamburg.de/pdf/giga_09_-wplO9-jockers-kohnert-
nugent.pdf, For a comprehensive analysis of Ghanaian national elections from 1992
forward, and their relation to Ghana's political stability, see Boafo-Arthur, supra note 39,
at 21-42.
156 See supra note 11.
157 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 45,
158 GHANA CONST. 1992 arts. 43, 44, 45; Electoral Commissions Act No. 451 § 2 (1993).
159 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 43.
160 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 51 ("The Electoral Commission shall, by constitutional
instrument, make regulations for the effective performance of its functions under this
Constitution or any other law, and in particular, for the registration of voters, the conduct
of public elections and referenda, including provision for voting by proxy."). In addition,
the Electoral Commission Act of 1993 provides:
The Commission shall by Constitutional instrument, make regulations for the
effective performance of its functions under this Act or any other law, and in
particular for-
(a) the registration of voters for public elections and referenda;
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Constitution provides that the EC acts as an independent
government institution.'6'
With 230 constituencies, over 21,000 polling stations, and 5000
electoral areas under its direct authority, the EC's election
administration responsibilities are of considerable magnitude
considering its limited resources to fulfill its existing obligations.6 2
Notwithstanding these limitations, international observers have
generally judged Ghana's elections progressively "free and fair"
for the past five general election cycles, beginning in 1992 and
including the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections
in December 2008.163
C. Liberal Constitution, Illiberal Underenforcement
Despite bearing the structural trappings of a constitutional
democracy, Ghana's underenforcement of the right to vote cast a
pall over its commitment to constitutionalism and democratization
until just recently. This paradox is endemic to emerging-and
(b) the conduct and supervision of public elections and referenda,
including provision for voting by proxy;
(c) the issue of identity cards; and
(d) other matters connected with the foregoing.
Electoral Commissions Act No. 451 § 1.5(12)(1) (1993).
161 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 46 ("Except as provided in this Constitution or in any
other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions, the
Electoral Commission, [sic] shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or
authority.").
162 See Parties Disappointed at EC's Attitude, DAILY GRAPHIC, April 29, 2009,
http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200804/15825.asp (discussing the EC's decision not to
re-open the Voter Register at all 21,000 polling stations but rather limit it to only 5,000
electoral centers due to financial constraints); see also Miranda Greenstreet & V.C.R.A.C
Crabbe, Pre-Election Press Statement, Dec. 6, 2004, COALITION OF DOMESTIC ELECTION
OBSERVERS, http://www.cddghana.org/documents/CODEO%20Pre-election %20Press%
20Statement%20Dec6 2004.pdf (discussing the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers'
(CODEO) deployment of 7,400 election day observes to Ghana's 230 constituencies,
which cover 21,000 polling stations).
163 Some reports of election controversies exist. See generally Jockers, Kohnert, &
Nugent, supra note 155 (arguing that there was measurable electoral fraud and ethnic
block voting in the 2008 elections and that the perceived inaction of the EC regarding
these claims will delegitimize future elections). However, the widely held perception, both
within and outside the country, is that Ghanaian elections have relatively low incidences of
the election administration violations, fraud, and corruption that often characterize newer
democracies. See Commonwealth Observer Group, supra note 143, at 38.
Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma said, "The Commonwealth
Observer Group found that the Electoral Commission of Ghana managed the process in a
professional and inclusive manner. The credible election has helped to further consolidate
Ghana's democracy." Id.
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maturing-democracies that have long labored under dictatorships
or military regimes. 64 New constitutions supplant old operations,
but not always the old operators. Judicial, legislative, and
administrative actors in newer democracies are often holdovers
from earlier regimes and, through inertia and the entrenchment of
norms, may carry on the status quo in ways that prohibit the full
expression of new, liberal constitutional values.165
Judicial underenforcement may occur when members of the
judiciary carry over from the previous political era and are not
retrained or reoriented.1 66 In these instances, there is a natural
proclivity toward continuity and the practice of "things as they
were" unless expressly prohibited. This outlook leaves affirmative
rights vulnerable to underenforcement. Not surprisingly, in
maturing democracies like Ghana, there are long-entrenched,
illiberal dispositions toward rights, especially with respect to those
who are less powerful. For example, until recently, citizens living
in prisons in Ghana were unable to compel the EC to enforce their
voting rights and register them to vote without judicial mandate,
while Ghanaian diasporans, whose substantial remittances help to
fuel the economy, were able to circumvent the judiciary by
successfully securing a legislative amendment to the constitution to
ensure their voting rights.67
One scholar has argued that the judiciary's weakened
enforcement of liberal constitutional norms in Ghana is
symptomatic of this phenomenon.168 In particular, he asserts that
the failure of Ghanaian courts to give full force to the liberal
constitutional ideals in the 1992 Constitution has produced
164 See Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22,24 (1997)
("Far from being a temporary or transitional stage, it appears that many countries are
settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a
substantial degree of illiberalism.").
165 it is important to reemphasize that none of this means that Ghana is an illiberal
democracy. Rather, it is a maturing democracy in the process of developing its identity
and attitudes concerning respect for the rule of law, constitutionalism, and democracy. See
generally Zakaria, supra note 25.
166 There are obvious parallels with respect to long-term officeholders in the legislative
and administrative contexts.
167 See supra notes 54, 63.
168 See Prempeh, A New Jurisprudence for Africa, supra note 22, at 139 (noting that a
study of appellate decisions from 1993 to 1999 suggests that the "Ghanaian judiciary
remains attached to a jurisprudence that is far more authoritarian than liberal").
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"asymmetrical jurisprudence" with respect to the constitutional
norm of freedom of press.6 9
The assumption seems to have been that, given a new
constitution with a host of rights-friendly provisions, limitations
on government power, and guarantees of judicial
independence, judicial review will lead to a liberal-democratic
jurisprudence almost as a matter of course. Yet the evidence
that is emerging, especially from the common-law jurisdictions,
suggests that there is a significant risk that an asymmetrical
jurisprudence will take hold, with the constitutional text
contemplating a rights-friendly, liberal-democratic
jurisprudence while the actual decisions and reasoning of the
courts take a different course.17 0
However, Ghana's Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
Article 42 in Ocansey/CHURCIL is indicative of significant
doctrinal development on matters of democratic participation that
may impact positively the enforcement of other constitutional
norms. It is precisely the "hard" cases where Ghana's
commitment to newer constitutional norms and democratic
principles is rigorously tested. By enforcing constitutional
principles to invalidate criminal disfranchisement, the judiciary has
passed the test. 7' The clear textual support for GIC voting rights
made this a relatively easy case of constitutional interpretation.
However, the force of inertia and the strength of the status quo
could have proved formidable impediments to constitutional
enforcement in this context. The enforcement of constitutionalism
requires a broader paradigm shift to fully and finally distance
newer democracies from their less liberal pasts. Failure to do so
may carry significant long-term costs. An enforcement imperative
brings the issue to the fore and a progressive and independent
judiciary is essential to this solution.
IV. THE ENFORCEMENT IMPERATIVE FOR MATURING
DEMOCRACIES
While many developing democracies focus heavily on the
democratic processes and rights that cement the structure of
democracy, the goal of democratization is to ensure the rule of law
169 See generally id. (illustrating instances of "asymmetrical jurisprudence" in the
Ghanaian judiciary's freedom of press jurisprudence).
170 Id. at 136 (emphasis in original).
171 Id. at 138.
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as it is developed through processes that reflect the will of the
people. Accordingly, constitutional democracies must rely on the
recognition, protection, and enforcement of their constitutions as
the principal means of maintaining their legitimacy and integrity.
Constitutionalism assumes an articulation of principles, standards,
and rights that collectively serve as both authority for and
limitations on government power by higher, supreme law.
Accordingly, one could argue that the rule of law is where
constitutionalism and democracy intersect. The rule of law
provides an important element of absolutism that is necessary to
ensure that the ideals of constitutional democracy are in fact
realized. Without the rule of law, constitutional democracy might
only exist as a well-articulated set of laws, principles, and
aspirations devoid of force and dependent upon the mutual
interests and assent of traditional law enforcers, such as the
judiciary, administrative agencies, and the police.
By its "thinnest"17 2 definition, the rule of law is flouted when
government fails to abide by legal strictures on its authority and
abrogates laws absent legal process.
Formal conceptions of the rule of law do not however seek to
pass judgment upon the actual content itself. They are not
concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good law or
a bad law, provided that the formal precepts of the rule of law
seek to go beyond this.173
Indeed, "[tjhe rule of law is open to any kind of content."174
By contrast, democracy derives its legitimacy from the assent of
the people subject to governance under a democratic regime and
necessarily embodies a normative judgment of the law's
substance. 7 1
172 See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 102-13 (2004) (defining the cumulative conceptions of the rule of law from
"thinner" to "thicker" in their reliance on or incorporation and embodiment of formalism
and substance).
173 Id. at 91-92.
174 Id. at 97. This article does not espouse the rule of law as an absolute moral good in
and of itself. Rather, this Article operates from the less controversial premise that the rule
by law-government's adherence to its own laws-is generally preferable to lawlessness or
arbitrary override.
175 Despite the important links among and between the rule of law, democracy, and
constitutionalism, "[djemocracy and the rule of law are not necessarily congruent .... Yet
realising the principle of democracy necessarily implies realising the principle of
constitutionality-and vice versa." We Believe in a Rule of Law Which Respects and
Protects, WASH. POST, June 9, 1984, at A14 (quoting Declaration of Democratic Values).
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Legal scholarship on African countries often provides an
undifferentiated analysis, focusing on extreme failures of
governance or humanitarian operations. Rarely are components
of constitutionalism subjected to thorough and detailed analysis.
Instead of tweaking around the edges, scholars look to overhaul.
However, when faced with a scenario like that of Ghana, where
the system is workable and has ultimately produced the
constitutionally correct result, refinement is a better, more
affirming, and deserved solution. Indeed, while the purpose of this
Article is not to determine whether Ghana's practice of
disfranchising GICs was sound as a normative matter,'76 it
presumes that an expansive right to vote is integral to free and fair
elections, which are, in turn, the bedrock of constitutional
democracy.177 To the extent that excluding participation in the
electoral processes that help determine the constructs of the
democracy compromises its legitimacy, such exclusion is anathema
to the concept of democracy itself.178 Moreover, in a constitutional
"Constitutionality enables democracy to exist as a way of life for self-responsible and self-
determined citizens." BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION, THE KAF DEMOCRACY REPORT
2006, at 10 (2006), available at http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/research
dem-rep_06.pdf (last visited Aug. 29,2009).
176 While this Article does not take a position on the propriety of criminal
disfranchisement as a normative matter, it is important to note that the compound
conception of the rule of law-as both formal legalism and political liberty-would seem
to support the notion that the disfranchisement of GICs violated the rule of law. This is
not to be confused with an argument in support of a universal franchise as a moral matter.
Instead, permitting greater electoral participation enhances the procedural safeguards that
democratic processes provide to formal legality, which may or may not produce a moral
outcome. "When democracy is cited as grounds for the legitimacy of law, and the values
of formal legality are offered as additional reasons for legitimacy, the moral claim of law
to obedience might seem weighty. It should not be forgotten, however, that neither of
these formal mechanisms ensure that the laws enacted and carried out will be moral in
content or effect." Tamanaha, supra note 172, at 101. See also Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra
note 18 (opinion of Owusu, J.), at 11 ("The issue is not whether prisoners must be given
the right to vote but rather what the position of the law is under the constitution.").
177 H. Kwasi Prempeh artfully argues that analyses of structural constitutionalism in
Africa have received short shrift, if any, and the overwhelming focus on procedural
constitutionalism has overshadowed this important means of fully realizing
democratization in Africa. See Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1294, By
focusing on the right to vote, this Article does not attempt to value juridical or procedural
constitutionalism more than structural constitutionalism as means of achieving
democratization. Rather, the analysis here assumes that the right to vote is not a creation
or expansion of constitutionalism but rather a protection of the same through full
expression and enforcement of the constitution. Id.
178 See Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, J.), at 29 ("True
democracy recognizes certain key fundamental values and principles. Without these there
can be no functional democracy. A core value of any democratic system is the concept of
20101 473
474 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 18:425
democracy, there is little beyond flagrant human rights violations
that is a greater affront to the democratic process than a failure to
enforce and protects rights guaranteed by the Constitution,
especially when those rights are integral to the operation of
democracy, such as the right to vote.
Independent of democracy concerns, the rule of law violation
is at the heart of the matter. A violation of the rule of law is
corrosive to a maturing democracy, and was even more concerning
than denying the vote to the relatively small number of GICs,
because it called into question Ghana's commitment to its
constitutional values. Guarding the constitution is a most
important commitment for a maturing democracy and one in
which the judiciary plays an integral role. Failure to do so would
make the court-as the ultimate guardian of the constitution-
complicit in its underenforcement and in the perpetuation of a
systemic electoral inconsistency."o
sovereignty of the people, and as expressed through right [sic] to choose representatives,
through whom the sovereign will of the people, shall be exercised.").
179 For a general discussion of constitutionalism in Africa and the role of the judiciary,
see Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1244-48 (advocating for structural
constitutionalism rather than juridical constitutionalism, arguing that the focusing on the
latter "plac[es] undue faith in judicial review"). Prempeh's critique in both papers is that
the focus on democratization through the political process has been at the expense of
extending constitutionalism to government structure (structural versus procedural
constitutionalism). Recognizing this critique, this Article does not suggest that this reform
or reforms like it will launch Ghana or other developing/maturing democracies into an
entrenched democratized state. Rather, I see these as preventive measures against the
backsliding and neglect of constitutional enforcement that may undermine the broader
goals of constitutionalism and democracy. Also, unlike the critique that election reform
inures largely to the benefit of rival elites, respecting Ghana's Constitution as an inviolable
legal instrument ensures that its expansive and inclusive language is given meaningful
effect. The attendant result will be to empower a marginalized sector of the population,
which furthers democratic goals and is also consistent with the proposition that the goal
was "not to reform or transform government as to be a part of government." Prempeh,
Africa's "Constitutionalism Revival," supra note 22, at 501 (emphasis in original). See
generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); Peter Vondoepp, The Problem of Judicial Control in
Africa's Neopatrimonial Democracies: Malawi and Zambia in Comparative Review, 120
POL. SCI. Q. 275 (2005) (underscoring the importance of an independent judiciary for new
democracies in Africa); Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and
Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (1996).
180 This is indeed why the current legal challenge to GIC vote denial is important. See
generally Charles Takyi-Boadu, N.G.O. Opposes E.C. at Supreme Court, GHANAIAN
CHRON., June 22,2009.
2010] FAIR MEASURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
A. Criminal Disfranchisement as a Systemic Electoral
Inconsistency
As a maturing democracy, Ghana is continuously establishing
and reinforcing the rule of law and constitutionalism.
Underenforcement of the constitutional norm of universal suffrage
threatened both efforts. Ghana's Constitution expressly affirms its
commitment to democracy and constitutionalism: "Ghana shall be
a democratic State dedicated to the realization of freedom and
justice; and accordingly, sovereignty resides in the people of
Ghana from whom Government derives all its powers and
authority through this Constitution."8 1 However, by
disfranchising its incarcerated citizens, Ghana flouted the very
precept of its democracy in at least two key respects: respect for
constitutionalism and respect for the rule of law. This was cause
for concern, not only for Ghana as an individual constitutional
democracy, but also to the extent that Ghana serves as a
barometer of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.xs2
Rather than engage in the familiar practice of evaluating
African democracy exclusively through a western lens, Ghana's
practice of disfranchising GICs should be evaluated according to
Ghana's own articulation of democratic principles, the rule of law,
and constitutionalism. Indeed, this is what the analysis of systemic
electoral inconsistencies requires. By examining the government's
professed democratic ideals and pairing them with relevant
electoral practices and policies, we can determine whether
systemic electoral inconsistencies exist. Furthermore, Ghana's
professed ideals ultimately appeared to guide its Supreme Court in
determining how to bring the rhetorical electoral inconsistency
into alignment with Ghana's democratic identity.18
There is a surfeit of historical and contemporary rhetoric
embracing the rule of law in Ghana. Ghana's earliest and most
prominent modern leaders have emphatically espoused the virtues
181 GHANA CONST. 1992 art. 35(1).
182 Indeed, Ghana has popularly acknowledged and even embraced its position of role
model within the African political landscape. See Francis Okeke, 2011: Nigeria Can Get It
Right, Says Ghana Electoral Chief, DAILY TRUST, Oct. 8, 2009,
http:/Iwww.news.dailytrust.comlindex.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7469:2
011-nigeria-can-get-it-right-says-ghana-electoral-chief&catid=l:latest-news&Itemid=119;
Uchenna Awom, Ghana to Lecture Nigeria on Credible Elections, LEADERSHIP NIG.,
Sept. 27, 2009, http://www.leadershipnigeria.comlindex.php/news/cover-stories/6523-
ghana-to-lecture-nigeria-on-credible-elections.
183 Ocansey/CHURCIL, supra note 18 (opinion of Wood, CJ).
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of the rule of law widely and often.184 In his inaugural address,
after the election that marked Ghana's evolution from a nascent to
a maturing democracy, newly-elected President John Atta Mills
proclaimed that he would uphold and prioritize the rule of law."8 s
In addition to popular and political rhetoric, Ghana's general
respect for the rule of law is visible in several seminal legal
opinions. For example, in New Patriotic Party v. Rawlings and
Another,"' Ghana's highest court held that the new framework of
the 1992 Constitution could be applied against its highest officer,
the President, in determining the scope of presidential immunity.
Specifically, the Court held:
[W]henever it is alleged that the President has by himself or
any agent acted in a manner inconsistent with or in
contravention of a provision of the Constitution, 1992 an action
may be brought against him under Article 2 of the Constitution
for a declaration to that effect, and for consequential orders.'8 7
Considering Ghana's post-colonial history of dictatorial
governance and militarism, this ruling signaled the country's
integrated commitment to upholding the new constitution.8
Ghana's more recent constitutional jurisprudence has reflected "a
growing determination" for the rule of law and due process.'89 In
Tuffour v. Attorney-General,90 the Court of Appeal, sitting as the
184 Ghana's leaders have embraced the concept of the rule of law since independence.
See, e.g., Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: Law in Africa, 6 J. AFRICAN L. 103, 103 (1962) ("Law,
to be effective, must represent the will of the people and be so designed and administered
as to forward the social purpose of the state.").
185 But see Kwesi Jonah, Mills' Rule of Law Clause Dangerous,
http://ghanaelections2008.blogspot.com/2009/01/kwesi-jonah-mills-rule-of-law-clause.html
(Jan. 8, 2009, 5:01 EST) (articulating concerns in certain political camps about the new
president's reference to the rule of law as code for anticipated prosecution of former
political leaders).
186 New Patriotic Party v. Rawlings and Another, [1994] 2 G.L.R. 193,207 (Ghana).
187 Id
188 Indeed, Ghana's juridical development concerning the rule of law has ripened
significantly since the notorious 1961 decision in In re Akoto, in which the Supreme Court
dealt a blow to individual rights and the rule of law. See Tsatsu Tsikata (No. 1) v.
Attorney-General, [2002] S.C.G.L.R. 189, 222 (Ghana) (noting that "if the decision had
gone the other way" in In re Akoto, [19611 2 G.L.R. 523, individual rights and the rule of
law would have been entrenched in Ghana far sooner).
189 Tsatsu Tsikata, S.C.G.L.R. at 225 ("There is now a growing determination on the
part of the peoples of the modem state to have enshrined in their constitutional process
the concept of the rule of law, or what is called in other jurisdictions 'due process."'). The
Apaloo decision further suggests that a challenge to the disfranchisement of GICs would
receive thoughtful consideration by the Supreme Court.
190 Tuffuor v. Attorney-General, [19801 G.L.R. 637 (Ghana).
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Supreme Court of Ghana, quashed any doubt as to whether the
constitution was the supreme law of the land.191 Further, the
Apaloo decision cemented the Court's role as the ultimate arbiter
of protecting the right to vote and, by extension, enforcing
constitutionalism:
[Tihe courts should and would protect the right to vote at all
costs as it has previously protected the right to register,
otherwise, democracy in this country would be
undermined .... As guardians of the Constitution, and the
rights and freedoms provided therein ... including the right to
vote, which is the first basic right and the pivot upon which all
other rights rest, it is the bounden duty of this court, to strike
down an act which has the effect of taking away the full and
free enjoyment of the franchise .... 192
The forceful protectionist language of the Court underscores
Ghana's broad commitment to constitutionalism and protection of
the right to vote as integral to that effort.
To be sure, considering the relatively small number of citizens
directly harmed by criminal disfranchisement in Ghana, this
practice was not a dire threat to Ghana's democratic or
constitutional foundation.193 Moreover, as a practical matter,
given Ghana's priorities concerning democratization, it is unlikely
that the practice of criminal disfranchisement, in and of itself,
could be viewed as an emergent threat to its legitimacy as a
democracy. However, these are not the appropriate inquiries for
purposes of judging the significance and cost of continued
constitutional underenforcement and what could mean for
Ghana's democracy. The disfranchisement of GICs, as an
abrogation of the Constitution's conferred right to vote, signified a
loose thread in the fabric of Ghana's constitutional democracy;
191 Id. at 647-48.
192 Apaloo, G.L.R. at 14-16.
193 There are approximately 13,000 incarcerated citizens in Ghana out of a total
population of approximately 23,832,495. See CIA, The World Factbook: Ghana,
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbookgeosigh.html (last visited Dec.
2, 2009); King's College London, Prison Brief for Ghana, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/
depstallaw/research/icps/worldbrief/wpb country.php?country=22 (last visited Dec. 2,
2009). At present, there are approximately forty-seven prison establishments. Id, Of this
population, approximately 29.1% are pre-trial detainees. Id. With an official capacity of
8,004, Ghana's prison facilities are operating at 171% capacity. Id. The conditions of
Ghana's prisons impact both internal and external assessments of democracy. For a
compelling narrative account of the Ghanaian prison condition, see Raymond A.
Atuguba, Ghana and Her Prisons and Prisoners: Stories from the Field, AFLA LEGAL
AID J. (forthcoming 2010).
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while this may not lead to its full unraveling, it certainly frays it.
This is particularly so when there is little formal resistance to the
underlying normative question of whether prisoners should have
the right to vote.194  Moreover, constitutional violations are
evaluated not on the number of persons harmed but on the direct
harm to constitutionalism as a foundational principle of
constitutional democracy. In addition, because the citizens most
affected by this breach of the rule of law and constitutionalism are
part of a discrete and insular minority removed from the political
process, this violation of rights should be subject to the most
stringent review.195 For these reasons, there can be no greater
priority for a developing or maturing democracy than obeisance to
the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Not only
does constitutional underenforcement harm Ghana's
constitutionalism objectives directly, it also reinforces an under-
valuation of constitutionalism in the region as a whole. 196
194 See Tazoacha Asonganyi, Rule of Law as Bulwark of Independents Electoral
Commissions, ENTREPRENEUR (Cameroon), Jan. 28, 2009, available at
http://www.entrepreneurnewsonline.com/2009/01/rule-of-law-as-bulwark-of-independents-
electoral-commissions.html,
Indeed, the entire Constitution reads like a manifesto of the people of Ghana
that they hand to every elected representative of the people to ensure that
they do not deviate from the principles laid down in the Constitution and only
make qualifications, rules and laws ". . .as are necessary in a free and
democratic society and are consistent with this Constitution. . . ."
The Ghanaian electoral commission does its work well because it is protected
by the rule of law, which is upheld by a Judiciary that is independent.
Id. See also Tazoacha Asonganyi, Electoral Commission: Pillar of Ghana's Successful
Democracy, ENTREPRENEUR (Cameroon), Jan. 28, 2009, available at
http://www.entrepreneurnewsonline.com/2009/01/electoral-commission-pillar-of-ghanas-
successful-democracy.html (lauding the organization and accomplishments of Ghana's
Electoral Commission in contrast with Cameroon and other African nations).
195 This argument finds support in the well-known American constitutional law case of
U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), in which the Supreme Court of the
United States laid the groundwork for strict scrutiny of constitutional infringements based
on the argument that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
196 There are many countries that allow persons with a criminal conviction to vote
based on an expansive interpretation of a constitutionally granted universal right to vote.
See supra pp. 21-25. Moreover, there are numerous examples of countries that have
disfranchised their incarcerated citizens expressly within a constitutional framework. See
supra note 121. Ghana's practice of disfranchising GICs follows neither approach and
instead results in a de facto denial of the right to vote that neither honors the right to vote
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Conversely, the willingness of Ghana's Supreme Court to enforce
the fair measure of the right to vote by acknowledging and
enforcing the voting rights of GICs strengthens the concept of
constitutionalism within Ghana and among other countries in the
region.
Notwithstanding the constitutionalism objectives, it is
important to analyze, as a pragmatic matter, where this issue falls
within Ghana's scheme of national priorities. Certainly, the
substandard economic condition of the majority of Ghanaians and
widespread illiteracy threaten the growth and sustainability of
democracy in Ghana.'9 7  However, juxtaposing the necessities of
democratization to quotidian societal needs as a zero-sum calculus
does a disservice to the very populations such analysis is intended
to protect. Democratization in Africa and socioeconomic
development can no longer be legitimately "framed as a choice
between 'a full belly' . . . and the ballot," and certainly not in a
politically and economically stable nation such as Ghana, despite
the overwhelming concerns that remain on matters of poverty,
education, employment, and health. 98 Indeed, the challenge to
constitutionalism lies in part with low levels of public demand for
judicial enforcement because of limited literacy and limited
awareness of rights.199
Against this backdrop, it is clear that the continued
underenforcement of the right to vote did not comport with
Ghana's professed dedication to the rule of law and
constitutionalism, its progress toward democratization, or its role
as a regional model in democracy building. To maintain its
established under Article 42 of the Constitution nor appropriately amends this provision
to be consistent with its practice.
197 See Posting of Ben Ofosu-Appiah to African Path Blog,
http://www.africanpath.com/p-blogEntry.cfm?blogEntrylD=5488 (June 6, 2003, 5:55 EST)
[hereinafter Ofosu-Appiah].
198 Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1285. But see Ofosu-Appiah, supra
note 197 ("Ghana cannot pride itself as being democratic if a section of the people are ill-
fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and economically insecure.").
199 See Prempeh, Marbury in Africa, supra note 22, at 1296-98 (2006) (describing the
"[diemand [slide [clhallenges to [j]udicial [rleview in Africa"). See also Stanton, supra
note 58.
The current process. . .forces anyone who disagrees with the legality of a
regulation once passed to initiate a judicial review process. This is an
expensive and cumbersome way in which to address problems that could be
avoided if there were an opportunity for stakeholder consultation and scrutiny
prior to promulgation of proposed regulations.
Id.
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adherence to principles of constitutionalism in its democratic
processes, Ghana's judiciary rightfully permitted GICs to vote,
thereby avoiding the process of constitutional amendment to
legitimize the practice. Ghana's continued failure to enforce the
fair measure of the right to vote would have left it outside the
bounds of its internal laws and, more significantly, outside the rule
of law. Instead, by heeding the imperative of enforcement,
Ghana's courts have helped to solidify its development as a
maturing democracy and a model of democratization. Now the
task of enforcement is left to the EC and, ultimately, to the
judiciary to ensure that its decree is followed.
B. Popular Sentiments Supporting Enforcement
Although it has been established that, as a matter of law,
GICs have the right to vote, it is also important to examine the
social context that ripened the enforcement of the fair measure of
the right to vote. In the years leading up to Ghana's Supreme
Court's decision to enforce the voting rights of GICs, popular
debate in the press and electronic media-surrounding whether
GICs should be permitted to vote -revealed little formal dissensus
on the matter. Most opposition arose in response to the legal
action filed by the LRC prior to the most recent presidential
elections" and, later, in response to the action filed by
CHURCIL.201 However, notable powerbrokers and stakeholders
have generally been in accord that, as a normative proposition,
GICs should not be denied the right to vote. This sentiment is
generally consistent with the informal empirical research I
conducted on this issue.202 My informal empirical studies
200 See supra note 54. See also Richard Obeng-Mensah, Are Detainees & Prisoners
Entitled to Vote?, Ghana Home Page (May 19, 2008), http://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=143965 (discussing prisoner voting).
201 Takyi-Boadu, supra note 180.
202 To the best of my knowledge, this Article contains the only empirical data regarding
the popular views of Ghanaians on the policy of criminal disfranchisement. A brief note
on my research methodology is in order: I lived in Ghana for ten months from 2005 to
2006, conducting research as a Fulbright Scholar on issues of democracy, criminal
disfranchisement, and prison conditions. By relying on a plethora of domestic data, I have
attempted to authenticate the concerns surrounding criminal disfranchisement through the
voices and perspectives of Ghanaians and minimize emphasis on foreign participants and
observers about national and local views. I conducted legal research at the University of
Ghana, Legon, the Ghana National Archives, and at Kwame Nkrumah University of
Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana (KNUST). The Legal Resources Centre of
Ghana was my host institution for this project and provided immeasurable support. With
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demonstrate that, long before the two actions that precipitated
Ghana's Supreme Court's enforcement of prisoner voting rights
were filed, the Ghanaian citizenry possessed the political and
social will to adhere to constitutionalism and enforce the voting
rights of GICs. This popular sentiment is relevant to the extent
that it reinforces the chasm between the rhetoric of democracy and
the manner in which it is practiced in a maturing democracy.
In a survey of 600 Ghanaians of varied demographic
backgrounds, seventy-two percent stated that they would vote
"'yes" on a public referendum to allow prisoners the right to
vote.2 03 Only forty-one percent stated that they believed prisoners
should lose the right to vote while in prison.204 Anecdotally, many
people surveyed seemed to believe, as the Court later held, that
the Constitution prohibited GICs from voting. When they were
read the text of Article 42, nearly all of these individuals thought
that GICs should be permitted to vote since nothing in the
Constitution expressly forbids GIC voting. A smaller number of
interviewees concluded that GICs should be permitted to vote
regardless of whether they are denied or granted the right to vote
by law. On balance, it seemed that the opinions of the
interviewees were shaped by their perception of the rule of law
(that is, whether the Constitution provides any affirmative support
for the current practice of disfranchisement).
The results of these studies not only underscore the general
support for and lack of formidable opposition to enforcement of
GIC voting rights, but also serve to buttress the popular
commitment of Ghanaians to the rule of law. Indeed, other
the assistance of eight trained graduate students of KNUST, I oversaw the administration
of over 600 surveys. All interviewees were Ghanaian citizens of at least 18 years of age.
In addition, all interviewees were informed that the surveys formed part of an academic
research project and were not related to any partisan, governmental, or commercial
enterprise, and that all identifying information, such as names and contact information,
would be kept confidential.
In addition to the surveys, I also conducted approximately twenty-five formal, in-depth
interviews of government representatives, members of the judiciary, international
organizations, local nongovernmental organizations, and academics. I also had informal
discussions with representatives of these groups and other members of the public. I found
nearly all of my contacts to be very open, responsive, and receptive to inquiry. All
meetings, surveys, and interviews that I conducted directly were in English. Please note
that those who contributed to the empirical research either as assistants or interviewees do
not necessarily endorse my analysis or my conclusions, nor are they responsible for any
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surveys conducted from 1999 to 2005 show that Ghanaians, as a
whole, overwhelmingly embrace democracy.205 While Ghanaians
have generally expressed satisfaction and patience concerning the
development of democracy in their homeland,20 as the longevity
of Ghana's democracy advances, popular expectations of its future
implications are increasing.207
The views articulated in the survey results anecdotally reflect
an expansive view of citizenship best summarized by E.H. Ofori-
Amankwah, Dean and Professor of the Faculty of Law at Kwame
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology:
[Elven though the institutional treatment of [prisoners] male
or female, young and old does present many knotty problems
of law and human rights issues, they do not cease to be citizens
of the state and members of the community out of which they
were whisked into prison, and into which they will ultimately
return after serving their sentences.
Offenders do not cease to be human beings, much less citizens
of the state and only the necessary "human rights" can be
taken away in keeping with their status as convicted persons
(such as the curtailment of their movement etc.). 208
Moreover, as Ghanaians have recently grappled with both
internal and external conceptions of citizenship in connection with
extending voting rights to Ghanaians citizens living abroad, the
connection between this issue and the voting rights of GICs has
not been lost.209
205 See AFROBAROMETER, BRIEFING PAPER No. 18, SUSTAINED SUPPORT FOR
DEMOCRACY IN GHANA 1, 7 (2005), available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/
papers/AfrobriefNol8.pdf [hereinafter AFROBAROMETER No. 18]; AFROBAROMETER,
BRIEFING PAPER No. 9, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ALTERNATION: EVOLVING
AFRICAN ATTITUDES 2 n.4 (2004), available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/
AfrobriefNo9.pdf.
206 See AFROBAROMETER No. 18, supra note 205, at 6-7.
207 Eighty-eight percent, or almost nine out of ten, "Ghanaians expect their views to
form the basis of programmes initiated by their elected representatives [in Parliament]."
AFROBAROMETER NO. 20, supra note 39, at 1.
208 E.H. Oforoi-Amankwah, Human Rights and the Criminal Process in Ghana, I
KNUST L.J. 111, 121, 127 (2005).
209 Many of the individuals I interviewed, including GICs, were aware of the then-
ongoing debate regarding whether voting rights existed or should be extended to the
Ghanaian diaspora. They uniformly posited that if Ghanaian citizens who did not
presently reside in the country should have the right to vote, then surely those citizens
residing in the country, even in prison facilities, should be permitted to vote absent express
law to the contrary.
FAIR MEASURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Among opinion leaders who have spoken out on the issue,
support for enforcing the right to vote of GICs is consistent.2 1 0
Nana Obiri Boahen, former Minister of State at the Ministry of the
Interior, has argued that "[ejven if there were any such law
[denying voting rights to GICs,] that would be against the
fundamental rights of people."2 1' In addition to embracing the
rule of law, President Atta Mills has espoused basic principles of
equality under the law and democratic egalitarianism, suggesting a
general support for the enforcement of the constitutional rights of
GICs. Indeed, President Mills has stated that Ghana must:
ensure that [its] laws work in a system that is blind to one's
place in society or one's political persuasion. . . [and] ensure
social justice, equity and equality under the laws of Ghana.
There is only one Ghana, and that Ghana must work in the
interests of every Ghanaian.212
Most notably, the EC seemed to agree with the concept of
extending voting rights to GICs.213 The Chairman of the EC, Dr.
Afari-Gyan, was primarily concerned with the safety of the staff of
the EC and a lack of clarity on the legal provisions for prisoners to
vote.2 1 ' The EC acknowledged that there is a conflict between
Article 42 and the residency requirement prohibiting a prison from
serving as a place of residence for purposes of registration but
argued that clarification must be sought in a court of law and did
not seek administrative clarification of the law. With the added
210 See also Interview with Judge Francis Emile Short, Former Chairperson of the
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana from 1993 to 2004,
TV 3, ModernGhana.com (last visited April 26,2010).
Even with people who are in prison, I don't see any problem about exercising
that right [to vote]. I really, I can't speak for the Electoral Commission but I
would, I think, it should be possible to put in the necessary mechanisms in the
prisons to ensure that, you know, prisoners exercise their right to vote.
Id.
211 Will Prisoners Vote?, http://ghanaelections2008.blogspot.com/2008/05/will-prisoners-
vote.html (May 15, 2008 2:49, EST).
212 President Professor John Evans Atta Mills, Inaugural Speech, January 7, 2009
available at http://www.ghc-ca.com/Animation/speech.pdf.
213 See Makalo, supra note 131.
214 Prisoners Have Constitutional Right to Vote-CHRI, DAILY GRAPHIC, May 26,
2008, available at http://news.myjoyonline.com/news/200805/16655.asp.
215 See Makalo, supra note 131. To be sure, there are some legitimate concerns about
the integrity of the voting process as it concerns GICs: (1) the government might engage in
election fraud by registering prisoners and forcing them to vote for the party in power, (2)
violence or disruption in prisons may occur around elections and election results based on
partisanship, and (3) the safety of election personnel could be threatened. Indeed, at a
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force of the Ocansey/CHURCIL decision, the enforcement
imperative requires that Ghana's judiciary ensure that its decree is
honored and that the EC enforces the constitution in a timely and
efficient manner.
V. CONCLUSION
In 2002 democratization expert Nicholas van de Walle wisely
counseled that "[w]e must not forget that even if day-to-day
politics falls short of democratic ideals, the typical sub-Saharan
country is measurably more democratic today than it was in the
late 1980s."1216 Today, the democratic landscape in Africa is even
more verdant with promise than when van de Walle made these
remarks. Ghana's recent judicial enforcement of its constitutional
provisions to allow prisoners the right to vote is strong evidence of
this promise and of the self-regulation necessary for African
nations to advance their democratization. Indeed, if African
nations and other developing democracies are to be recognized
internally and externally as democracies, then the unwavering
expectations at home and abroad must be that democratic
principles are followed, the rule of law is respected, constitutional
norms are enforced, and systemic electoral inconsistencies are
minimized. For all democracies, failure to adhere to the rule of
law is a threat to internal stability and external standing. For
developing and maturing democracies, such as Ghana, the threat is
necessarily greater in magnitude and impact, notwithstanding the
resource limitations and other internal challenges that may
legitimately frustrate constitutional enforcement.
When faced with the existing chasm between the
constitutional norm of the right to vote and its practice of
disfranchisement, Ghana's judiciary followed the only option
consistent with Ghana's democratic trajectory and sound
constitutional enforcement: it followed the rule of law by enforcing
fair measure of the right to vote. Ghana has successfully
2008 colloquium organized by CODEO, the EC expressed concerns regarding the safety
of its staff and the constitutionality of permitting GICs to vote. Will Prisoners Vote?,
supra note 211. See also Makalo, supra note 131 ("It is the courts that can get them out to
come and vote and, if that happens, the EC cannot prevent them. But if we are going to
do this, we must get assurances that our officials will be safe."). However, most if not all
of these concerns would apply to the general citizenry as well, and to the extent that there
are empirical justifications for these concerns, there are safeguards that can be put in place
that would be more viable and exact a lesser cost than vote denial or abridgement.
216 Nicolas van de Walle, Africa's Range of Regimes, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 67.
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transitioned from its status as a new democracy to a "maturing"
one. It is continuing to clear significant hurdles and serving as a
regional and global model of democracy. By resolving the
systemic electoral inconsistency that resulted from the under-
enforcement of its right to vote, Ghana's judiciary demonstrated
that a constitutional norm as integral to its democratic identity as
the right to vote cannot be undermined by administrative fiat if it
seeks to maintain an abiding faith in constitutionalism, democracy,
and the rule of law.
As a case study, Ghana also highlights the concern
surrounding non-judicial underenforcement of constitutional
norms and the susceptibility of non-judicial actors to consciously
or unconsciously condition enforcement on impermissible factors
such as social status. This is illustrated most acutely by the
disparate treatment of GICs and Ghanaian diasporans with
respect to enforcing the right to vote. The microanalysis of
underenforcement of such a constitutional norm in a maturing
democracy further underscores the importance of understanding
the broader legal and political contexts in which
underenforcement occurs. Indeed, "[c]onstitutionalism is the end
product of social, economic, cultural, and political progress; it can
become tradition only if it forms part of the shared history of a
people."2 17 This is especially true if the insights derived from U.S.
Constitution-based metadoctrinal analysis are exported to an
international comparative context, as in this Article, further
expanding the instructional value of this important body of
scholarship.
217 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 137, at 80.
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